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ABSTRACT: We examine an environment where objects and privately-informed buyers ar-
rive stochastically to a market. The seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation prob-
lem with a changing population. We characterize the set of incentive compatible allocation
rules and provide a generalized revenue equivalence result. In contrast to a static setting
where incentive compatibility implies that higher-valued buyers have a greater likelihood
of receiving an object, in this dynamic setting, incentive compatibility implies that higher-
valued buyers have a greater likelihood of receiving an object sooner.
We also characterize the set of efficient allocation rules and show that a dynamic Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanism is efficient and periodic ex post incentive compatible. We then
derive the revenue-maximizing allocation rule and show that the optimal direct mecha-
nism is a pivot mechanism with a reserve price.
Finally, we consider sequential ascending auctions in this setting, both with and without
a reserve price. We construct memoryless equilibrium bidding strategies in this indirect
mechanism. Bidders reveal their private information in every period, yielding the same
outcomes as the direct mechanisms. Thus, the sequential ascending auction is a natural
institution for achieving either efficient or optimal outcomes. Interestingly, this is not the
case for sequential second-price auctions, as the bids in a second-price auction do not re-
veal sufficient information to realize either the efficient or the optimal allocation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we study the mechanism design problem of a seller in a dynamic market. In each
period, a random number of buyers and objects arrive to the market. Buyers are risk-neutral and
patient, while objects are homogeneous and perishable. Each buyer desires a single unit of the
good in question, and valuations for the good vary across buyers. A mechanism designer must
elicit the private information of these buyers in order to achieve her desired outcome—either an
efficient or a revenue-maximizing allocation.
We show that many of the properties of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism in the
static world carry through to our dynamic setting. In particular, by using a dynamic analogue of
the VCG mechanism, the social planner ensures that truth-telling by all agents is an equilibrium,
resulting in an efficient allocation. Moreover, we show that the optimal (revenue-maximizing)
mechanism in this dynamic setting is essentially a pivot mechanism with a reserve price. Finally,
we characterize a simple indirect mechanism, the sequential ascending auction, that serves as a
natural institution for achieving either the efficient or the optimal outcome.
The role of population dynamics in markets is an under-studied topic that is of great impor-
tance. This is especially true because the vast majority of “real-world” markets are asynchronous:
not all buyers and sellers are available or present at the same time. Rather, agents arrive at the
market at different times, interact with various segments of the population, and then transact at
different times. This fact, in conjunction with the potential arrival or departure of agents from the
market in the future, leads to a trade-off: competition in the future may be higher or lower than at
the present time, and opportunities to trade may arise more or less frequently. Thus, agents must
choose between transacting now or waiting until the (uncertain) future.
In addition to this dynamic trade-off, an additional strategic element arises due to competition
between agents across time. Buyers and sellers may face the same competitors repeatedly, imply-
ing that individuals will want to learn the private information of others. Moreover, each agent
may be concerned about how her competitors will make use of any information that she reveals
about herself.
To make these trade-offs and considerations more concrete, consider for a moment the problem
faced by a buyer searching for a product on an online auction market such as eBay. Upon her
arrival to the market, this buyer will have available to her a variety of auctions to participate
in. Moreover, she can choose to “wait and see,” postponing her participation until a future date.
Supposing that our buyer does, in fact, choose to participate in an auction immediately, she must
then decide how much to bid. However, her willingness to pay will depend on her expectations
about the future. From her perspective, future supply is random—she does not know when the
next auction for a similar item will take place, nor how many such future auctions may occur.
Similarly, future competition—the number of potential competitors, as well as their strength—is
unknown to our buyer.
In addition, this hypothetical buyer on eBay has available to her a wealth of information. She
may observe the prices at which similar items have sold for in previous auctions, as well as the
actual bids submitted by various competitors. While rational bidding behavior requires the in-
corporation of such information into a submitted bid, our buyer may also be concerned with how
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her bid, given its observability, will affect others’ behavior. She could, for instance, try to strate-
gically alter her competitors’ expectations about the future—submitting a relatively high bid, for
example, could serve as a “signal” of high future competition.
Taking these considerations into account, it is clear that population dynamics can have a signifi-
cant impact on issues such as competition, price determination, efficiency, and revenue. And given
this impact, it is natural to question how this impact varies across different institutions or market
forms. Therefore, in the present work, we are concerned with two main questions. First, what
outcomes are attainable in markets with dynamic populations of privately-informed buyers? In
particular, can we achieve efficient or revenue-maximizing outcomes? And secondly, and equally
importantly, can we achieve these outcomes using natural or simple “real world” institutions?
The approach we take to answering these two questions is to develop a reasonably general
model of a dynamic environment that reflects some key features of markets where dynamic popu-
lations are important. Note that we do not model eBay or some other specific market “X.” Rather,
we are interested in determining how far the intuitions provided by static models may be pushed,
where those intuitions break down, and what new insights and approaches are necessitated by
market dynamics.
Thus, the model we present abstracts away many of the details of such dynamic markets, fo-
cusing instead on what we view as their essential features. In particular, demand is not constant,
as the set and number of buyers change over time, with patient buyers entering and exiting the
market according to a stochastic process. Similarly, supply is random. In some periods there may
be many units available, while in others none. Finally, each buyer’s valuation—her willingness
to pay—is her private information. Therefore, a welfare- or revenue-maximizing seller must pro-
vide appropriate incentives for information revelation to this dynamic population. The seller then
makes use of this information to dynamically allocate goods to buyers.
A natural candidate for achieving a welfare-maximizing allocation is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanism. It is well-known that, in static environments, the VCG mechanism is efficient. By
choosing a transfer payment for each buyer that equals the externality imposed by her report on
other participants in the mechanism, the VCG mechanism aligns the incentives of the buyer with
those of a welfare-maximizing social planner. This leads to efficiency and dominant-strategy in-
centive compatibility, as truthful reporting now maximizes both the planner’s and the buyers’
objective functions. In the dynamic environment we consider, the arrival of a new buyer imposes
an externality on her competitors by reordering the (anticipated) schedule of allocations to those
buyers currently present on the market, as well as to those buyers expected to arrive in future
periods. We show that by charging each agent, upon her arrival, a price equal to this expected
externality, the buyer’s incentives are aligned with those of the forward-looking planner. There-
fore, this dynamic version of the VCG mechanism is efficient; however, the sequential nature of
arrivals and reports implies that dominant-strategy incentive compatibility is beyond reach, and
truth-telling is instead a periodic ex post equilibrium.
In addition, we are able to construct a revenue-maximizing direct mechanism for this setting.
Making use of the risk-neutrality of buyers, we show that the optimal policy for a revenue-
maximizing seller is equivalent to that of a social planner who wishes to maximize allocative
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efficiency, except that buyers’ values are replaced by their virtual values. Each buyers’ incentives
may then be aligned with those of the seller by a variation of the VCG mechanism where buy-
ers face discriminatory reserve prices. By providing each newly arriving buyer with an expected
payoff equal to her expected marginal contribution to the virtual surplus, the seller is able to in-
duce the truthful reporting of private information. This allows the seller to discriminate between
buyers in such a way as to maximize revenue.
Both of the mechanisms discussed above are direct revelation mechanisms, requiring buyers
to report their values to the mechanism upon their arrival to the market. In practice, however,
direct revelation mechanisms may be difficult to implement. For instance, the multi-unit Vickrey
auction—the (static) multi-unit generalization of the standard VCG mechanism—is a direct revela-
tion mechanism in which truth-telling is a dominant strategy. Despite this, Ausubel (2004) points
out that it lacks simplicity and transparency, explaining that “many [economists] believe it is too
complicated for practitioners to understand.” Moreover, Rothkopf, Teisberg, and Kahn (1990) ex-
plain that concerns about privacy or the potential for future misuse of information revealed in
a direct mechanism may preclude the real-world use of direct mechanisms. These criticisms are
corroborated by experimental evidence. According to Kagel, Harstad, and Levin (1987), who ex-
amined single-unit auctions with affiliated private values, the predictions of auction theory for
bidding behavior are significantly more accurate in ascending price-auctions than in second-price
auctions, despite the existence of a dominant-strategy equilibrium in the second-price (Vickrey)
auction. Kagel and Levin (2009) find a similar result in multi-object auctions with independent pri-
vate values: ascending-type clock auctions significantly outperform the dominant-strategy solv-
able Vickrey auction in terms of efficiency. In another study examining the efficiency properties of
several mechanisms in a resource allocation problem similar to the one we consider here, Banks,
Ledyard, and Porter (1989) find that “the transparency of a mechanism . . . is important in achiev-
ing more efficient allocations.” In their experiments, a simple ascending auction dominated both
centralized administrative allocation processes as well as decentralized markets in terms of both
efficiency and revenues.
With these criticisms and “real-world feasibility” constraints in mind, we turn to the design of
simple and transparent indirect mechanisms. In particular, we consider the possibility of achiev-
ing efficient or revenue-maximizing outcomes via a sequence of auctions. Despite the resemblance
of our direct mechanisms to their single-unit static counterparts, we find that this relationship
does not hold for the corresponding auction formats. Recall that, in the canonical static allocation
problem, the analogue of the VCG mechanism is either the second-price auction or the ascending
auction. In our dynamic environment, however, a sequence of second-price auctions cannot yield
outcomes equivalent to those of the dynamic VCG mechanism. In a sequential auction, there is
an “option value” associated with losing in a particular period, as buyers have the possibility of
winning an auction in a future period. The value of this option depends, in general, on the pri-
vate information of all other competitors, as the expected price in the future will depend on their
values. Thus, despite the assumption of independent private information, the dynamics of the
market create an environment with interdependent values.
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Therefore, a standard second-price sealed-bid auction does not reveal sufficient information for
the determination of buyers’ option values. In contrast, the ascending auction is a simple open
auction format that does allow for the gradual revelation of private information. We use this fact
to construct intuitive equilibrium bidding strategies for buyers in a sequence of ascending auc-
tions. In each period, buyers bid up to the price at which they are indifferent between winning an
object and receiving their expected future contribution to the social welfare. As buyers drop out
of the auction, they (indirectly) reveal their private information to their competitors, who are then
able to condition their current-period bids on this information. When this process of information
revelation is repeated in every period, newly arrived buyers are able to learn about their competi-
tors without being privy to the events of previous periods. This information renewal is crucial
for providing the appropriate incentives for new entrants to also reveal their private information,
leading to prices and allocations identical to the truth-telling equilibrium of the efficient direct
mechanism. Moreover, these strategies form a periodic ex post equilibrium: given her expecta-
tions about future competition, each buyer’s behavior in any period remains optimal even after
observing her current opponents’ values.
Similar arguments apply when considering revenue-maximizing indirect mechanisms. When
buyers’ values are drawn from the same distribution, the sequential ascending auction with an
optimally-chosen reserve price admits an equilibrium that is equivalent to truth-telling in the op-
timal direct mechanism. Thus, the sequential ascending auction is a natural institution for achiev-
ing either efficient or optimal outcomes.
The present work contributes to a recent literature exploring dynamic allocation problems and
dynamic mechanism design. Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) develop the dynamic pivot mecha-
nism, a dynamic generalization of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism that yields efficient out-
comes when agents’ private information evolves stochastically over time. Athey and Segal (2007)
characterize an efficient dynamic mechanism that is budget-balanced and incentive compatible,
again in the presence of evolving private information. In a similar dynamic setting, Pavan, Se-
gal, and Toikka (2009) consider the more general question of characterizing incentive-compatible
mechanisms. While these papers study dynamic mechanisms for a fixed set of buyers whose types
may change over time, we examine a setting where the number and set of buyers may change over
time but types are fixed.
This paper also relates to work on dynamic auctions and revenue management. For instance,
Mierendorff (2008) characterizes an auction mechanism that efficiently allocates a single storable
object when buyers arrive over the course of the auction. Pai and Vohra (2008) derive the revenue-
maximizing mechanism for allocating a finite number of storable objects to buyers whose arrival
to and departure from the market is also private information. Vulcano, van Ryzin, and Maglaras
(2002) also examine optimal mechanisms for selling identical objects to randomly arriving buyers.
When the objects are heterogeneous but commonly-ranked, Gershkov and Moldovanu (2008a)
and (2008b) derive revenue maximizing and efficient mechanisms. In contrast to the present work,
the buyers in these models are impatient, and there is a fixed number of storable objects to be
allocated.
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Finally, our analysis of indirect mechanisms is linked to the sequential auctions literature. The
seminal work is Milgrom and Weber (2000), which examines the properties of a variety of auction
formats for the (simultaneous or sequential) sale of a fixed set of objects to a fixed set of buyers.
However, they allow for neither discounting nor the entry of new buyers, features that play a
central role in our model. Said (2009) examines the role of random entry in a model of sequential
second-price auctions when objects are stochastically equivalent; that is, when values are indepen-
dently and identically distributed across both buyers and objects. The computer science literature,
motivated in part by the emergence of online auction sites such as eBay, has also turned attention
towards sequential ascending auctions. Lavi and Nisan (2005) and Lavi and Segev (2008) examine
the “worst-case” performance of sequential ascending auctions with dynamic buyer populations.
Their prior-free, non-equilibrium analysis provides a lower bound on the efficiency of the alloca-
tions achieved via sequential ascending auctions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the general model,
introduces dynamic mechanisms, and extends the static payoff- and revenue-equivalence results
of Myerson (1981) and Maskin and Riley (1989) to a dynamic environment. In Section 3, we fully
characterize the efficient allocation rule and show that truth-telling is periodic ex post incentive
compatible in dynamic versions of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. We then construct an
efficient equilibrium of the sequential ascending auction in Section 4 and show that it is outcome
equivalent to the dynamic pivot mechanism. Section 5 parallels the development in Sections 3
and 4, characterizing the revenue-maximizing allocation policy and constructing an optimal direct
mechanism for its implementation. We then show that revenue maximization may be achieved
using the sequential ascending auction with a reserve price, in a manner analogous to the equiv-
alence of the static Myerson (1981) optimal auction and the second-price auction with an optimal
reserve price. Finally, Section 6 concludes. All proofs are found in the Appendix.
2. MODEL
2.1. Buyers, Objects, and Random Arrivals
We consider an infinite-horizon discrete-time environment; time periods are indexed by t, where
t ∈ N0 := N ∪ {0}. There is a countable set I of buyers, where each agent i ∈ I desires a single
unit of a homogeneous, indivisible good. Each buyer i’s valuation vi for this good is her private
information, and vi is independently distributed according to the distribution Fi. We assume that
Fi has a strictly positive and continuous density fi and support V := [0, v¯], and that each buyer’s
virtual valuation
ϕi(vi) := vi − 1− Fi(vi)fi(vi)
is a strictly increasing function of vi.1 Moreover, we assume that buyers are risk neutral, and that
their preferences are quasilinear and time separable. The future is discounted exponentially with
the (common) discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
1The assumptions on Fi are merely for expositional convenience. All the efficiency-related results continue to be true
with general distributions. Moreover, for revenue-maximization, we may use the procedure of Skreta (2007) to define
“ironed” virtual values ϕ̂i that may be used whenever ϕi is not increasing or well-defined.
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Buyers are not assumed to be present in each period. Rather, buyers arrive stochastically to the
market. In particular, the set I of buyers is partitioned into disjoint subsets {It}t∈N0 , where It
is the finite subset of agents who may arrive in period t. The arrival of agent i ∈ It in period t
is governed by an independent draw from a Bernoulli distribution, where pii ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
probability that i is present. In addition, buyers may depart from the market after each period,
where the (common) probability of any buyer i “surviving” to the following period is denoted by
γ ∈ [0, 1]. Otherwise, buyers remain present in the market until they receive an object. Note that,
unlike the probability of arriving to the market, the survival rate is identical across agents.
Thus, the arrivals and departures of buyers yield a stochastic process {αt}t∈N0 , where αt : I →
{0, 1} is an indicator function of the presence of each agent in period t, and
At := {i ∈ I : αt(i) = 1}
is the subset of agents present in period t. We assume that buyers cannot conceal their presence,
and so αt (equivalently, At) is commonly known to the agents present at time t.
In addition to the random arrival of buyers, several units of a homogeneous, indivisible, and
non-storable good may also arrive on the market. Let kt ∈ K := {0, 1, . . . , K} denote the number of
objects that arrive in period t, where K ∈N is the maximal number of objects potentially available
in any given period. As with buyers, the arrival of objects is governed by a stochastic process,
where µt(k) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability that exactly k ∈ K objects are available in period
t. Moreover, these objects are non-storable; any unallocated objects “expire” at the end of each
period, and hence cannot be carried over to future periods. This assumption plays an important
role in the determination of the efficient policy, providing a great deal of tractability. As with
the buyer arrival process, we assume that the arrival of objects is publicly observed, and so kt is
commonly known to those agents present on the market at time t.
Thus, at the beginning of each period, new buyers arrive to the market (and old buyers may
depart). Simultaneously, new objects arrive, replacing any unallocated objects left over from the
previous period. It will be useful to denote the “state” of the market at the beginning of each
period t by ωt := (αt, kt). The realizations of the arrival and departure processes are publicly
observed by all agents present on the market, implying that ωt becomes common knowledge to
all agents present at time t. The mechanism designer may then allocate objects to agents, and we
move on to the following period.
2.2. Dynamic Direct Mechanisms
In this setting, a dynamic direct mechanism asks each agent i to make a single report, upon
arrival to the market, of her type vi.2 We denote by ∅ the “report” of an agent who has not arrived
to the market. Thus, the mechanism designer has available to her in each period a collection of
reports rt : It → V ∪ {∅}, where R is the set of all such reports. Note that the report ri ∈ V of an
agent i who has arrived need not be truthful, as this will depend upon the incentives provided by
the mechanism.
2It is straightforward to see that the revelation principle applies in this setting, and so the restriction to direct mecha-
nisms is without loss of generality.
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Let Ht denote the set of period-t histories, where each history ht ∈ Ht is a sequence of arrivals
and departures (of buyers and objects), agent reports, and allocations up to, and including, period
t− 1. Thus, we have
ht = (ω0, r0, x0; ω1, r1, x1; . . . ; ωt−1, rt−1, xt−1) ,
where xs =
{
xi,s
}
i∈I ∈ X := {0, 1}I is the allocation in period s.
A dynamic direct mechanism is then a sequence of feasible allocations and feasible monetary trans-
fersM = {xt,pt}t∈N0 , where we abuse notation and denote by
xt : Ht × {0, 1}I ×K×R → ∆(X)
a collection of allocation probabilities for each agent, and denote by
pt : Ht × {0, 1}I ×K×R → RI
a collection of monetary transfers from each agent. The period-t allocation xt = {xi,t}i∈I is a feasible
allocation if, and only if,
∑
i∈I
xi,t ≤ kt
and
xi,t = 0 for all i /∈ At.
These two conditions require, respectively, that no more objects than are available in period t are
allocated at that time, and that objects are only allocated to agents that are present on the market.
Notice that we have implicitly ruled out the possibility of allocating multiple objects to any agent
as a consequence of the single-unit demand assumption. Similarly, pt = {pi,t}i∈I is a feasible
monetary transfer if, and only if,
pi,t = 0 for all i /∈ At;
that is, agents who are not present on the market cannot make or receive payments.
We assume that, upon her arrival to the market in period t, agent i ∈ It observes only the
current state of the market ωt; that is, the set At of agents present on the market (equivalently, the
indicator αt) and the number kt of objects available at time t. Agent i does not observe the history
of arrivals and departures in previous periods or the history of allocative decisions, nor does she
observe the reports of agents who have arrived before her. Thus, a reporting strategy for agent i,
conditional on having arrived to the market, is simply a mapping
ri : V× {0, 1}I ×K → V.
Let r−i denote the reports of all agents other than agent i ∈ It. The expected payoff to i when she
reports ri ∈ V to the mechanismM and all other agents report according to r−i is then
E
[
∞
∑
s=t
δs−t
(
xi,s (hs,ωs, (ri, r−i)) vi − pi,s (hs,ωs, (ri, r−i))
)]
,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the arrival and departure processes of buyers and
sellers, as well the history ht and the reports of all other agents that may be present on the mar-
ket. Note that we have dropped the dependence of reporting strategies on histories and market
presence to simplify notation.
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2.3. Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality
Consider a direct mechanismM = {xt,pt}t∈N0 and fix an arbitrary period t and an arbitrary
agent i ∈ It. Since we will be examining Bayesian implementation as opposed to dominant strat-
egy implementation, suppose that all other agents j 6= i are reporting truthfully; that is, suppose
that
rj(vj,ωs) = vj
for all s ∈ N0, all j ∈ Is \ {i}, and every (vj,ωs) ∈ V× {0, 1}I ×K. For notational convenience,
we will denote this strategy by v−i.
Recall that agent i ∈ It, upon her arrival, observes only the set At of agents present on the
market and the number kt of objects available in period t. Thus, we may define
Ui(v′i, vi,ωt) := E
[
∞
∑
s=t
δs−t
(
xi,s
(
hs,ωs, (v′i, v−i)
)
vi − pi,s
(
hs,ωs, (v′i, v−i)
) )]
.
Ui(v′i, vi,ωt) is the expected payoff of agent i ∈ It from reporting v′i ∈ V when her true type is
vi ∈ V and the (observed) current market state is given by ωt ∈ {0, 1}I ×K.
The mechanismM is incentive compatible if, for all t ∈N0 and all i ∈ It,
Ui(vi, vi,ωt) ≥ Ui(v′i, vi,ωt) for all vi, v′i ∈ V and all ωt ∈ {0, 1}I ×K.
Thus, M is incentive compatible if truthful reporting by all agents, regardless of their time of
entry, the agents present upon their arrival, and the number of objects available, is an equilibrium.
Notice that this condition is equivalent to requiring interim (Bayesian) incentive compatibility for
each agent, for every realization of the arrival processes and every realization of the agent’s values.
Similarly,M is individually rational if, for all t ∈N0 and all i ∈ It,
Ui(vi, vi,ωt) ≥ 0 for all vi ∈ V and all ωt ∈ {0, 1}I ×K.
Thus, M is individually rational if all agents prefer to participate (truthfully) in the mechanism
than not, where we have normalized the outside option of each player to zero. As with incentive
compatibility, this must hold for every realization of the arrival processes and the agent’s values.
2.4. Payoff and Revenue Equivalence
Notice that, due to the agents’ risk neutrality and the quasilinearity of payoffs, we may rewrite
the payoff functions Ui as
Ui(v′i, vi,ωt) = qi(v
′
i,ωt)vi −mi(v′i,ωt),
where
qi(v′i,ωt) := E
[
∞
∑
s=t
δs−txi,s
(
hs,ωs, (v′i, v−i)
)]
(1)
is the expected discounted sum of object allocation probabilities, and
mi(v′i,ωt) := E
[
∞
∑
s=t
δs−t pi,s
(
hs,ωs, (v′i, v−i)
)]
(2)
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is the expected discounted sum of payments. Since buyers ultimately care only about the expected
discounted probability of receiving an object and their expected discounted payment, the seller
can restrict attention to these two functions when designing incentive schemes—we are able to
simplify the incentive problem faced by a seller in this setting by reducing the problem to a single-
dimensional allocation problem.
Therefore, we may rewrite the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints as
qi(vi,ωt)vi −mi(vi,ωt) ≥ qi(v′i,ωt)vi −mi(v′i,ωt) for all vi, v′i ∈ V
and
qi(vi,ωt)vi −mi(vi,ωt) ≥ 0 for all vi ∈ V,
for all t ∈N0, all i ∈ It, and all ωt ∈ {0, 1}I ×K.
Define for all t ∈N0 and i ∈ It the function Ûi : V× {0, 1}I ×K → R by
Ûi(vi,ωt) := qi(vi,ωt)vi −mi(vi,ωt).
Ûi is then the expected payoff of agent i from truthfully reporting her value vi. Making use of
this function, we are able to generalize the classic Myerson (1981) characterization of incentive
compatibility and expected payoffs. In particular, we have the following result.
LEMMA 1 (Characterization of implementable mechanisms).
A direct mechanismM = {xt,pt}t∈N0 is incentive compatible and individually rational if, and only if, the
following conditions are satisfied for all t ∈N0 all i ∈ It, and all ωt ∈ {0, 1}I ×K:
(1) qi(vi,ωt) is nondecreasing in vi;
(2) Ûi(vi,ωt) = Ûi(0,ωt) +
∫ vi
0
qi(v′i,ωt) dv
′
i for all vi ∈ V; and
(3) Ûi(0,ωt) ≥ 0.
This lemma is the dynamic population analogue of the Myerson (1981) and Maskin and Riley
(1989) results for static allocation problems. Recall that in static settings with single-unit demand,
incentive compatibility requires that increasing a buyer’s type should increase (weakly) her prob-
ability of receiving an object. In our dynamic setting with single-unit demand, incentive compati-
bility instead requires that increasing a buyer’s type should, roughly speaking, increase (weakly)
her probability of receiving an object sooner. More precisely, the expected discounted sum of each
agent’s allocation probabilities must be nondecreasing in that agent’s value, regardless of the state
of the market upon her arrival. This is a consequence of the fact that there are now multiple op-
portunities to receive an object: if a buyer does not receive an object in the period of her arrival,
she may still receive one in future periods.
Moreover, the expected payoffs of a buyer in any two mechanisms with the same allocation
rule can differ only by a constant. This immediately implies the following straightforward gen-
eralization of the revenue equivalence theorem to our environment, which we state here without
proof.
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COROLLARY 1 (Revenue equivalence).
If the dynamic direct mechanism M is incentive compatible, then for all t ∈ N0 all i ∈ It, and all
ωt ∈ {0, 1}I ×K, the expected payment of type vi ∈ V of buyer i, conditional on entry, is
mi(vi,ωt) = mi(0,ωt) + qi(vi,ωt)vi −
∫ vi
0
qi(v′i,ωt) dv
′
i.
If, in addition,M is individually rational, then mi(0,ωt) ≤ 0.
Therefore, in any incentive compatible dynamic mechanism, the expected payment of a buyer
depends (up to an additive constant) only upon the allocation rule. This fact will be particularly
useful in deriving a revenue-maximizing mechanism in Section 5.
3. EFFICIENT MECHANISMS
3.1. Efficient Policy
In order to examine the properties of efficient mechanisms in this setting, it is necessary to de-
velop an understanding of the efficient policy. Recall that, in the static single-object allocation
setting, allocative efficiency is equivalent to allocating the object to the highest-valued buyer. In
our dynamic setting, the structure of the environment—the nature of the arrival processes and
the non-storability of objects—implies that the socially efficient policy is essentially an assortative
matching. In particular, objects are ordered by their arrival time and buyers are ordered by their
values, and “earlier” objects are allocated to higher-valued buyers. Of course, the feasibility con-
straints imposed by the dynamic nature of the agent population have an impact on the nature of
the efficient policy, as the ordering of buyers by valuation need not correspond to the sequential
ordering of buyers by their periods of availability. Thus, the socially efficient allocation policy is,
in any given period, to allocate all available objects to the set of buyers currently present that have
the highest values.
We consider a social planner who, at time zero, chooses a feasible dynamic direct mechanism
M = {xt,pt}t∈N0 . The planner’s goal is to maximize allocative efficiency; that is, the planner
wishes to choose a mechanismM to maximize
W(M) := E
[
∞
∑
t=0
∑
i∈I
δtxi,t(ht,ωt, v)vi
]
subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints, where the expectation
is taken with respect to the arrival and departure processes, as well the values of the agents.
Recalling that qi(vi,ωt) from Equation (1) is agent i’s expected discounted probability of receiving
an object (conditional on entry), we may rewrite this objective function as
E
[
∞
∑
t=0
∑
i∈It
δtαt(i)qi(vi,ωt)vi
]
,
where αt(i) = 1 if i ∈ It arrives to the market and zero otherwise. (Recall that this arrival occurs
with probability pii ∈ [0, 1] for each agent i.)
Before a formal statement of our result, a few additional definitions are necessary. Fix any state
zt = (ht,ωt, v) ∈ Ht × {0, 1}I × K ×R, where v denotes the truthful reporting strategy by all
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agents. We denote by
A+(zt) :=
{
i ∈ At :
∣∣{j ∈ At : vj ≥ vi}∣∣ ≤ kt}
the set of agents who are among the kt highest-ranked buyers at state zt. Similarly, the set of agents
who are ranked outside the top kt agents is denoted by
A−(zt) :=
{
i ∈ At :
∣∣{j ∈ At : vj > vi}∣∣ ≥ kt} .
Finally,
A∼(zt) := At \
(
A+(zt)
⋃A−(zt))
is the set of agents who are “on the boundary”—the agents who are tied for the kt-th highest rank.
LEMMA 2 (Efficient allocation rules).
Suppose all buyers, upon arrival, report their true values. A feasible allocation rule {xt}t∈N0 is efficient if,
and only if, for all states zt = (ht,ωt, v) ∈ Ht × {0, 1}I ×K×R,
xi,t(zt) = 1 for all i ∈ A+(zt)
and
∑
i∈A∼(zt)
xi,t(zt) = kt − |A+(zt)| if |A+(zt)| < kt.
Note that the conditions in this lemma pin down the behavior of efficient allocation rules after
almost all histories.3 The second condition applies only in the case of “ties” among the agents,
which are probability zero events. Additionally, notice that the period-t efficient allocation does
not depend on past allocations or history; only the set of objects available (indicated by kt), the set
of agents present at time t (indicated by αt), and these agents’ reported values (denoted by vt) are
relevant.
Therefore, we will henceforth restrict attention to the efficient allocation rule which breaks ties
with equal probability. Thus, the efficient allocation rule is defined by
xˆi,t(ωt, vt) :=

1 if i ∈ A+
0 if i ∈ A−
kt−|A+|
|A∼| if i ∈ A∼
for all ωt ∈ {0, 1}I ×K and vt ∈ VAt , where we have dropped the dependence on histories.
From the perspective of any particular buyer i ∈ I , the efficient policy allocates an object after
a history to i if, and only if, i is among the highest-ranking buyers at that history. Thus, given the
values of all other agents, xˆi,t is nondecreasing in vi. Since this property holds for any arbitrary
history and realization of competitors’ values, it is straightforward to show that the expected dis-
counted probability of receiving an object qˆi is nondecreasing in vi. In light of the characterization
of incentive compatibility in Lemma 1, it is then be possible to construct an incentive compatible
dynamic direct mechanism which implements the efficient allocation rule.
3While it is straightforward to do so, we do not formally account for the zero-probability event in which a buyer’s value
equals zero. This simplifies both notation and exposition while leaving our results unchanged.
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3.2. Efficient Dynamic Direct Mechanisms
A logical candidate for such a mechanism is the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism. Re-
call that the VCG mechanism ensures that each agent’s payoff is their marginal contribution to
overall social welfare. In the static setting, the VCG mechanism is not only incentive compatible,
but it is also truthfully implementable in dominant strategies—regardless of the reports of other
agents, truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy for each buyer. We will now show that the dy-
namic formulation of the VCG mechanism is also efficient, and while it is not dominant-strategy
incentive compatible, it is periodic ex post incentive compatible; that is, regardless of the reports
of other agents who have already arrived on the market, and given expectations of future truth-
ful reporting by newly arriving buyers, truth-telling is a best response for all buyers upon their
arrival.
For any ωt ∈ {0, 1}I ×K and truthful vt ∈ VAt , define
W(ωt, vt) := E
[
∞
∑
s=t
∑
j∈I
δs−t xˆj,s(ωs, vs)vj
]
to be the social welfare (from period t on) when the efficient policy x̂ is implemented. Denoting
by ω−is the state of the market in period s ∈ N0 when agent i has been removed from the market
(that is, where we impose αs(i) = 0), we write
W−i(ω−it , vt) := E
 ∞∑
s=t
∑
j∈I\{i}
δs−t xˆj,s(ω−is , vs)vj
 .
for the social welfare (from period t on) when i is removed from the market and the efficient policy
x̂ is implemented. Thus, the arrival of agent i ∈ It to the market yields a marginal contribution to
the social welfare of
wi(ωt, vt) := W(ωt, vt)−W−i(ω−it , vt).
Thus, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is the dynamic direct mechanism M̂ := {x̂t, p̂t}t∈N0 ,
where x̂ is the socially efficient allocation rule, and the payment rule p̂ is defined by
pˆi,t(ωt, vt) := qˆi(ωt, vt)vi − wi(ωt, vt)
upon i’s arrival, and pi,s(ωs, vt) := 0 for all s 6= t, where qˆi denotes the discounted expected
probability of i ∈ It receiving an object given her arrival at time t.
PROPOSITION 1 (VCG is periodic ex post IC and IR).
The VCG mechanism M̂ is periodic ex post incentive compatible and individually rational.
Unlike in the static case, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism M̂ is not dominant-strategy
incentive compatible.4 This is due largely to the fact that, in contrast to the static VCG mechanism,
payments in the dynamic formulation are not distribution-free. In particular, the VCG mechanism
assigns payments based on the anticipated use of the efficient policy x̂ when all future agents are
4Thanks are due to Ilya Segal for suggesting the following counterexample and pointing out the difficulty in achieving
dominant-strategy implementation in sequential-move mechanisms, thereby correcting an error made in a previous
version of this paper.
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truthfully reporting their values. If a particular agent believes that agents arriving in the future
are not following the truth-telling strategy, then truthful reporting need not be optimal.
EXAMPLE (Truth-telling is not a dominant strategy).
To see why this is so, consider the special case of our model in which there is a single object available in each
of periods 0 and 1, and none thereafter. Assume that I0 = {1, 2} and I1 = {3}, and that v3 is distributed
uniformly on [0, 1]. Moreover, let δ = γ = pi = 1, and assume that it is commonly known that v1 = 23 and
v2 = 12 . Finally, assume that buyer 1 believes that buyer 2 will report truthfully while buyer 3 will report a
value of 0 regardless of the true realization of v3.
If buyer 1 report’s truthfully, her expected marginal contribution to the social welfare (under the assump-
tion of truthful reporting by all agents) is[
v1 + δ
(
F3(v2)v2 + (1− F3(v2))1+ v22
)]
−
[
v2 + δ
1
2
]
=
7
24
.
This implies that buyer 1 will be charged a price p1,1 such that
p1,1 = v1 − 724 =
3
8
,
leaving her with a net utility of
v1 − p1,1 = 724.
However, a (downward) misreport by buyer 1 can lead to an increase in her expected utility. Suppose
that buyer 1 reports v′1 =
1
3 < v2 < v1. Then her expected marginal contribution to the social welfare—as
computed by the mechanism—is given by[
v2 + δ
(
F3(v′1)v
′
1 + (1− F3(v′1))
1+ v′1
2
)]
−
[
v2 + δ
1
2
]
=
1
18
.
This implies that buyer 1 will be charged a price p′1,1 such that
p′1,1 = δF(v
′
1)v
′
1 −
1
18
=
1
18
,
leaving her with a net expected utility of
δv1 − p′1,1 =
11
18
>
7
24
.
Thus, truthful reporting is not a dominant strategy for buyer 1 given her beliefs.
Note that the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism M̂ charges each buyer a single payment upon
her arrival to the mechanism, regardless of whether the buyer receives an object immediately or
not. Since buyers are risk neutral, it is clearly possible to design other payment schemes with
differing streams of payments that are, in terms of expected utility, equivalent to p̂. This may be
especially desirable in the case that γ, the survival probability of each agent from one period to the
next, is less than 1. In this case, an agent may be charged a payment upon her arrival, but depart
from the market before receiving an object in a future period. Thus, while M̂ is individually
rational from the ex ante perspective of an agent arriving on the market, it need not remain so
upon that agent’s departure.
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One mechanism that does not suffer from this problem is the dynamic pivot mechanism of
Bergemann and Välimäki (2008). Their direct mechanism is essentially the generalization of the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism to the case in which agents’ private information may be chang-
ing over time. By choosing payments which provide agents with their flow marginal contribution
to the social welfare in each period, the dynamic pivot mechanism obtains truth-telling as an equi-
librium which implements the efficient policy.5 Moreover, in our sequential allocation problem,
the dynamic pivot mechanism imposes payments on agents only when they receive an object.
To see why this is true, note first that the flow marginal contribution of an agent i in period
t ∈N0 is simply the period-t contribution to the social welfare provided by i’s presence:
wFi (ωt, vt) := wi(ωt, vt)− δE [wi(ωt+1, vt+1)]
= W(ωt, vt)−W−i(ω−it , vt)− δ
(
E
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)
]
−E
[
W−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)
])
.
Thus, we may define the dynamic pivot mechanism as the dynamic direct mechanism M̂F :={
x̂t, p̂Ft
}
t∈N0 , where the payment rule p̂
F is defined by
pˆFi,t(ωt, vt) := xˆi,t(ωt, vt)vi − wFi (ωt, vt)
for all (ωt, vt). This mechanism yields to each agent flow payoffs equal to her flow marginal
contribution.
As stated above, pˆFi,t(ωt, vt) = 0 if i does not receive an object. Note that i does not receive an
object only if there are sufficiently many agents j ∈ At with vj > vi such that the efficient policy
allocates to the same set of agents, irrespective of the presence of i. Therefore,
W(ωt, vt)− δE
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)|x̂t(ωt, vt)
]
= ∑
j∈At\{i}
xˆj,t(ωt, vt)vj
and
W−i(ω−it , vt)− δE
[
W−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|x̂t(ω−it , vt)
]
= ∑
j∈At\{i}
xˆj,t(ωt, vt)vj
must be equal, implying that wFi (ωt, vt) = 0, and hence no payment is made by agent i. Moreover,
if the efficient policy does allocate an object to agent i in period t, then i will not be present on the
market in future periods, implying that
E
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)
]
= E
[
W−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)
]
.
Hence, i’s flow marginal contribution when she is allocated an object is exactly equal to her total
marginal contribution at that point in time.
Finally, note that the dynamic pivot mechanism inherits all the implementability properties of
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism in this context; in particular, M̂F is both incentive compat-
ible and individually rational, and truth-telling remains a periodic ex post optimal strategy for all
5Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) show this result in the context of a fixed agent population. Cavallo, Parkes, and Singh
(2007) are able to demonstrate that the dynamic pivot mechanism truthfully implements the socially efficient policy in
the presence of an evolving agent population.
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agents.6 This follows directly from the fact that agents’ payoffs are quasilinear. Hence, when agent
i considers the discounted sum of a stream of payoffs, each of which is equal to i’s flow marginal
contribution at some point in time, this is equivalent to a single, one-time payoff equal to i’s total
marginal contribution. Thus, we have the following result, which we state without proof.
COROLLARY 2 (Dynamic pivot mechanism is periodic ex post IC and IR).
The dynamic pivot mechanism is periodic ex post incentive compatible and individually rational.
4. AN EFFICIENT SEQUENTIAL AUCTION
It is important to keep in mind that both the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and the dy-
namic pivot mechanism are direct revelation mechanisms, relying on a planner to aggregate the
reported values of each buyer in order to determine allocations and payments. This raises an
important question: do these efficient mechanisms correspond to a familiar auction format? In
the static single-object case, Vickrey (1961) provided a clear answer: the analogue of the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanism for the allocation of a single indivisible good is the second-price auc-
tion. Both the sealed-bid second-price auction and the ascending (English) auction admit equi-
libria that are outcome equivalent to the VCG mechanism and are compelling prescriptions for
“real-world” behavior.7
A reasonable conjecture is that a sequence of auctions would be useful in the context of a se-
quential allocation problem. But what auction format would be desirable? As mentioned above,
the “standard” analogue of the VCG mechanism in static settings is the second-price sealed-bid
auction; however, a sequence of such auctions does not correspond to the dynamic versions of the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism considered above.
This failure of equivalence is due to the fact that a buyer participating in a sequence of auctions
has available to her an option: by losing in the current auction, she gains the ability to participate
in future elements of the sequence. Let us denote the expected value of this future participa-
tion by δV. Rational bidding behavior in a second-price sealed-bid auction then requires shading
one’s bid downwards by the value of this option—our bidder chooses her bid bi to maximize her
expected payoff, solving
max
bi
{
Pr
(
bi > max
j 6=i
{bj}
)
E
[
vi −max
j 6=i
{bj}
]
+ Pr
(
bi < max
j 6=i
{bj}
)
δV
}
.
Since the probability of winning and the probability of losing sum to one, we may rearrange the
above expression into an equivalent optimization problem:
max
bi
{
Pr
(
bi > max
j 6=i
{bj}
)
E
[
(vi − δV)−max
j 6=i
{bj}
]}
+ δV.
This, however, is exactly the problem faced by a bidder in a static second-price sealed-bid auction
when her true value is given by vi − δV; standard dominance-type arguments show that it is then
6Note that since agents’ types do not change over time, we can restrict attention to dynamic direct mechanisms that
require only a single report upon each agent’s arrival to the mechanism. This differs from the mechanism considered
by Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) which requires all agents to make a report in every period.
7Of course, the revenue equivalence theorem applies, and several other standard auction mechanisms are able to yield
efficient outcomes in the single-object static setting. However, they are not outcome equivalent to the VCG mechanism.
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optimal to bid
b∗i = vi − δV.
What, then, is this option value? Clearly, it is an expectation of future payoffs from participating
in the sequence of auctions, and hence will incorporate expected future prices. But these future
prices are determined by the valuations of one’s competitors, and hence the continuation value v
is itself a function of those valuations:
V = V(vi, v−i).
Thus, despite the fact that we have started in an independent private-values framework, market
dynamics (and competition across time, in particular) generate interdependence: buyers must learn
their competitors’ values in order to correctly “price” the option of future participation. Moreover,
this learning is not possible when using a second-price sealed-bid auction (or any other sealed-bid
auction format, for that matter), as the auction format simply does not reveal sufficient information
to market participants, and buyers will have to bid based on their expectations and beliefs about
their competitors:
b∗i = vi −E [δV(vi, v−i)] .
However, bidders that arrive to the market at different times will have observed different histo-
ries and will therefore have asymmetric beliefs about their competitors, and hence asymmetric
expectations. This leads to asymmetry in bids, which in turn generates inefficient outcomes.
A similar problem arises when considering the use of a second-price auction where bids are
revealed each period after the allocation of objects. In particular, in any period in which there are
new entrants, there will be buyers who are uninformed—and about whom incumbent buyers are
uninformed. Again, these two groups will have differential information, and hence differential
beliefs, thereby leading to inefficient outcomes. Note that this occurs despite the fact that bids
are being revealed. Since information revelation is occurring after the auction is over, buyers are
unable to condition their bids on that information. Instead, information revealed in the current
period can be used only in subsequent periods; information revelation is occurring too “slowly”
for information about others to be incorporated into current-period bidding.
This suggests the need for an open auction format, and in particular the ascending price auction.
In such an auction, a price clock rises continuously and buyers drop out of the auction at various
points. This allows buyers to observe the points at which their competitors exit the auction and
make inferences about their valuations. These inferences can then be incorporated into current-
period bidding, leading to bids that correctly account for the interdependence generated by market
dynamics: buyers can essentially submit bids
b∗i = vi − δV(vi, v−i),
thereby allowing for an efficient outcome.
To be specific, we make use of a simple generalization of the Milgrom and Weber (1982) “but-
ton” model of ascending auctions. In particular, we consider a multi-unit, uniform-price variant
of their model. The auction begins, in each period, with the price at zero and with all agents present
participating in the auction. Each bidder may choose any price at which to drop out of the auction.
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This exit decision is irreversible (in the current period), and is observable by all agents currently
present. Thus, the current price and the set of active bidders is commonly known throughout
the auction. When there are m ≥ 1 objects for sale, the auction ends whenever at most m active
bidders remain, with each remaining bidder receiving an object and paying the price at which
the auction ended. Note that if there are fewer than m bidders initially, then the auction ends
immediately at a price of zero. In addition, suppose that several bidders drop out of the auction
simultaneously, leaving m′ < m bidders active. The auction ends at this point, and m−m′ of the
“tied” bidders are selected with equal probability to receive an object—along with the remaining
active bidders—paying the price at which the auction closed. With this in mind, each bidder’s
decision problem within a given period is not the choice of a single bid, but is instead the choice of
a sequence of functions, each of which determines an exit price contingent on the (observed) exit
prices of the bidders who have already exited the current auction. Therefore, over the course of
the auction, buyers gradually reveal their private information to their competitors.
This process of gradual information revelation leads to an additional asymmetry, however.
Consider the group of buyers who participated in an auction in period t but lost. At the end
of the auction, they will have observed each others’ drop-out prices and inferred each others’ val-
ues, implying that at the beginning of period t + 1, they have essentially perfect and complete
information about one another. But in period t + 1, a new group of buyers, about whom nothing
is known, arrives on the market. We therefore have two differentially informed groups of buy-
ers. Moreover, if we want to achieve an efficient outcome, these new entrants must be induced to
reveal their private information despite being asymmetrically informed.
This asymmetry may be resolved via a process of information renewal: full revelation of all private
information in every period. This is achieved by using “memoryless” strategies: incumbent buy-
ers disregard their observations and information from previous periods and behave “as though”
they are uninformed. By doing so, all buyers are able to behave symmetrically, thereby allowing
newly arrived buyers to learn about their current competitors without knowledge of the events
of previous periods. All buyers, incumbents and new entrants alike, are thus provided with the
appropriate incentives to participate in the process of information revelation.
It is important to note that this memoryless behavior is an equilibrium best-response, and not
the result of a restriction on the set of strategies available to buyers. So why is it rational to “throw
away” payoff-relevant information from previous periods? Recall that buyers are engaging in
this process of information renewal and revelation in every period, and expect that (in equilib-
rium) all private information will be revealed again. In particular, there is no need for buyers to
condition their behavior at the outset of the current period on past history—buyers expect any
payoff-relevant information to be revealed anew over the course of the auction, allowing them to
condition their strategies on this information during the current period as it is revealed.
With this in mind, we now informally describe the strategies used by each player in the se-
quential ascending auction mechanism. In each period, buyers will remain active in the auction
until the price reaches the point at which they are exactly indifferent between winning immedi-
ately and participating in future periods. Moreover, these buyers believe that any future prices
they pay will equal the externality that they impose on the market; equivalently, they believe that
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the option value of future participation equals their expected future marginal contribution to the
social welfare:
δV(vi, v−i) = δE [wi(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (vi, v−i)] .
As competitors drop out of the auction and reveal their private information, each remaining buyer
recalculates this expected continuation value and redetermines her optimal drop-out point.
To formally describe the strategies, let nt := |At| = ∑j∈I αt(i) denote the number of buyers
present in period t. In addition, taking the perspective of an arbitrary bidder i, let
yt :=
(
yt1, . . . , y
t
nt−1
)
denote the ordered valuations of all other buyers present in period t, where yt1 is the largest value,
and ytnt−1 is the smallest. Finally, for each m = 1, . . . , nt − 1, let
v¯m := (v¯, . . . , v¯) ∈ Vm and y>mt :=
(
ytm+1, . . . , y
t
nt−1
)
.
If, in period t, all buyers are using symmetric strictly increasing bidding strategies, then the prices
at which buyers exit the auction will reveal their values. Thus, over the course of the auction
buyers will observe (in sequence) the realizations y>mt , allowing their bids to be conditioned on
this information.
Finally, we define, for each m = 1, . . . , nt − 1,
wt+1(ωt, vi, y>mt ) := δE [wi(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, y>mt )]
to be the (discounted) expected future marginal contribution of an agent i ∈ At with value vi,
where the expectation is conditional on the period-t presence of m competitors each with the
highest possible value v¯ and nt −m− 1 buyers ranked below i with values y>mt .
With these preliminaries in hand, we may now define the strategies used by each bidder. We
define, for each m = 1, . . . , nt − 1,
β̂tm,nt(ωt, vi, y
>m
t ) := vi − wt+1(ωt, vi, y>mt ). (3)
We will assume that, in each period t ∈N0, each agent i ∈ At bids according to β̂tm,nt whenever she
has m active competitors in the auction. Thus, each buyer i initially bids up to the point at which
she is indifferent between winning the object at the current price and receiving her discounted
expected marginal contribution in the next period, where the expectation is conditional on being
the lowest-ranked of the nt bidders currently present and all other bidders having the highest
possible valuation.8 Notice that, if vi > vj, then
wt+1(ωt, vj)− wt+1(ωt, vi)
= δE
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vj)
]
− δE
[
W−j(ω
−j
t+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vj)
]
− δE
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vi)
]
+ δE
[
W−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vi)
]
= δE
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vj)
]
− δE
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vi)
]
,
8This is not strictly necessary; any beliefs about the valuations of her opponents will suffice as long as the support of
those beliefs is contained in the interval (vi, v¯].
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since removing either i or j in the next period, conditional on her being the lowest-ranked agent,
does not affect the order of anticipated future allocations to any other agents. Moreover, note that
by treating buyer j as though her true value were vi, we can provide a bound for the difference
above. In particular, we have
δE
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vj)
]
− δE
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vi)
]
≥ E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
δs−t xˆi,s(ωs, vs)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vi)
]
(vj − vi).
Thus, if vi > vj, then
β̂tnt−1,nt(ωt, vi)− β̂tnt−1,nt(ωt, vi) ≥
(
1−E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
δs−t xˆi,s(ωs, vs)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vi)
])
(vi − vj) > 0
since the discounted expected probability of receiving an object in the future is bounded above by
δ < 1. Thus, the agent who is, in fact, the lowest-ranked buyer present in period t will be the first
to drop out of the period-t auction, publicly revealing her value.
At this point, each remaining buyer i bids until she is indifferent between winning the object
at the current price and receiving her discounted expected marginal contribution, conditional on
the knowledge that she is the second-lowest ranked of the nt − 1 bidders remaining active in the
auction, that all remaining active bidders have the highest possible valuation and that the lowest-
ranked buyer present has value ynt−1t < vi. In addition, suppose that buyer j with value vj was
the first to exit the auction. Then ynt−1t = vj < vi implies
wt+1(ωt, vj)− wt+1(ωt, vi, vj)
= δ
(
E
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vj)
]
−E
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−2, vi, vj)
])
− δ
(
E
[
W−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−2, vi, vj)
]
−E
[
W−j(ω
−j
t+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vj)
])
.
However, the second difference above may be rewritten as(
E
[
W−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−2, vi, vj)
]
−E
[
W−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−2, vi, vi)
])
+
(
E
[
W−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−2, vi, vi)
]
−E
[
W−j(ω
−j
t+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vj)
])
.
Thus,
wt+1(ωt, vj)− wt+1(ωt, vi, vj)
is the sum of three differences. The first is the gain in social welfare when increasing i’s value from
vi to v¯. The second is the gain in social welfare (when i is not on the market) from increasing j’s
value from vj to vi. Finally, the third difference is the loss in social welfare (when j is not present)
from decreasing i’s value from v¯ to vi. However, since vj < vi, the presence or absence of j from the
market has no influence on when the efficient policy allocates to i, regardless of whether i’s value
is vi or v¯. Therefore, the gain from the first difference equals the loss from the third difference,
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implying that
wt+1(ωt, vj)− wt+1(ωt, vi, vj)
= δ
(
E
[
W−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−2, vi, vj)
]
−E
[
W−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−2, vi, vi)
])
.
A bounding argument similar to the one previously applied may then be used to show that
β̂tnt−2,nt(ωt, vi, vj)− β̂tnt−1,nt(ωt, vj) > 0.
Thus, there is continuity at the first drop out point, in the sense that the exit of the lowest-valued
buyer does not induce the immediate exit of any buyer with a (strictly) higher value. Therefore,
if β̂tnt−2,nt(ωt, vi, vj) is increasing in vi, the price at which the second exit occurs fully reveals the
value of the second-lowest ranked buyer.
Similar logic may be used to show that β̂tm,nt(ωt, vi, y
>m
t ) is strictly increasing in vi for all m, and
that the “continuity” property described above holds after every exit from the auction.
LEMMA 3 (Bids are fully separating).
The bid functions β̂tm,nt(ωt, vi, y
>m
t ) are increasing in vi for all m = 1, . . . , nt− 1. Moreover, if vi > ym+1t ,
then
β̂tm,nt(ωt, vi, y
>m
t ) > β̂
t
m+1,nt(ωt, y
>m
t ).
Thus, if every buyer follows these strategies in each period, the efficient allocation is achieved.
Under the assumption (which we will shortly verify) that these strategies form an equilibrium of
the indirect mechanism in which an ascending auction is held in each period, Corollary 1 implies
that ex ante expected payments by buyers in this mechanism must be the same, up to a constant,
as in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism or the dynamic pivot mechanism. Since the marginal
contribution of a buyer with value equal to zero is identically zero, and the bid of such a buyer in
the conjectured equilibrium is also zero, this ex ante equivalence is exact. Analysis of the prices
paid in the auction mechanism, however, show that this equivalence extends further.
PROPOSITION 2 (Outcome equivalence of direct and indirect mechanisms).
Following the bidding strategies β̂tm,nt in every period t in the sequential ascending auction mechanism is
outcome equivalent to the dynamic pivot mechanism.
Therefore, following the bidding strategies prescribed in Equation (3) leads to an outcome that
is identical to that of truth-telling in the dynamic pivot mechanism. Moreover, we know from
Corollary 2 that truth-telling is an equilibrium of the dynamic pivot mechanism. It remains to be
shown, however, that the bidding strategies described in Equation (3) form an equilibrium of the
sequential ascending auction mechanism.
Since the sequential ascending auction mechanism is a dynamic game of incomplete informa-
tion, the equilibrium concept we use is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This solution concept re-
quires that behavior be sequentially rational with respect to agents’ beliefs, and that agents’ be-
liefs be updated in accordance with Bayes’ rule wherever possible. Since all buyers use the strictly
increasing bidding strategies β̂tm,nt , behavior along the equilibrium path is perfectly separating,
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implying that Bayesian updating fully determines beliefs. To determine optimality off the equi-
librium path, however, we need to consider the beliefs of bidders after a deviation. Since such
post-deviation histories are zero probability events, we are free to choose arbitrary off-equilibrium
beliefs. Therefore, we will suppose that, after a deviation, buyers disregard their previous obser-
vations, believing that the deviating agent is currently sincerely revealing her value in accordance
with β̂tm,nt .
This particular specification of off-equilibrium beliefs is particularly useful. Note that these be-
liefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule even after probability zero histories. This follows immediately
from the fact that, generally, this system of beliefs consists of point-mass beliefs about the types
of other agents. The only agents about whom beliefs do not take this form are those that have yet
to arrive to the market and those who win an object in the period of their arrival—these agents
reveal only a lower bound on their value.
Moreover, this property is equivalent to the condition of preconsistency of beliefs in an extensive
form game of incomplete information put forth by Hendon, Jacobsen, and Sloth (1996), which
Perea (2002) shows to be both necessary and sufficient for the one-shot-deviation principle to
hold.9 This is an important observation, as perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in contrast to sequen-
tial equilibrium, need not satisfy the one-shot-deviation principle.10 We can therefore prove the
following result.
PROPOSITION 3 (Equilibrium in the sequential ascending auction).
Suppose that in each period, buyers bid according to the cutoff strategies given in Equation (3). This
strategy profile, combined with the system of beliefs described above, forms a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
of the sequential ascending auction mechanism.
Propositions 2 and 3 jointly imply that the sequential ascending auction admits an efficient
equilibrium that also yields prices identical to those of the dynamic pivot mechanism. Thus, the
sequential ascending auction is a natural, intuitive institution that yields efficient outcomes.
It is interesting to note several additional properties of this equilibrium. First, the proof shows
that deviations from the bidding strategies β̂tm,nt are not rational for any agent, even when condi-
tioning on competitors’ values in the current period. Thus, the strategy profile specified in Equa-
tion (3) forms a periodic ex post equilibrium. Introduced by Bergemann and Välimäki (2008), this
notion requires that, given expectations about future behavior and arrivals of both objects and
buyers, each buyer’s current-period behavior is a best response to the strategies of her opponents,
regardless of the history and realized values of her competitors. Since agents essentially “report”
their values in each auction, the extensive-form structure of the indirect mechanism allows for
a much larger number of potential deviations from truthful behavior as compared to the direct
9This condition is called updating consistency by Perea (2002), and is also equivalent to part 3.1(1) of Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991)’s definition of a reasonable assessment.
10These off-equilibrium beliefs also satisfy the “no-signaling-what-you-don’t know condition” in Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991). This suggests that (aside from measurability issues) one could construct a conditional probability system for
this equilibrium that satisfies Fudenberg and Tirole’s conditions for perfect extended Bayesian equilibrium. The set of
all such equilibria coincides, in finite games, with the set of sequential equilibria.
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mechanisms discussed earlier. Despite this, however, there is no loss in the “strength” of imple-
mentation: both the direct and indirect implementations involve the same notion of periodic ex
post equilibrium.
Furthermore, notice that in the sequential ascending auction, buyers have the ability to drop
out immediately once an auction begins. Since the bidding strategies discussed above form a
periodic ex post equilibrium, buyers do not wish to take advantage of this possibility, even if they
know their opponents’ values. Thus, although we have assumed that buyers cannot conceal their
presence when arriving to the market, we may conclude that, in equilibrium, they would not take
advantage of that opportunity were it afforded to them. Moreover, the outcome equivalence result
(Proposition 2) implies that this logic extends to the direct mechanisms considered earlier.
5. REVENUE MAXIMIZATION
While the previous sections provide a characterization of efficient mechanisms, we have said
little about revenue and optimal mechanisms. In the static setting, Myerson (1981) showed that
the optimal mechanism for selling a single indivisible unit is a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism,
with the caveat that instead of allocating the good to the agent with the highest value, the seller
allocates the object to the agent with the highest virtual value. Maskin and Riley (1989) extend
Myerson’s insights to the setting in which multiple identical units are offered for sale and show
that, as in the single-unit case, the objects are allocated to the set of buyers with the highest virtual
valuations.
In our setting, however, while the objects are individual units of a homogeneous good, from the
perspective of an individual buyer, they are differentiated products. To make this clear, consider
a buyer i with value vi who is present at period t. If this buyer receives an object in period t, this
yields her utility vi. However, if she anticipates receiving an object in period t + 1, her valuation
for that object is δvi. Thus, she does not value the two objects identically. While there does exist a
literature on auctions for multiple heterogeneous objects, much of the focus has been on efficiency
and not revenue maximization.11 Thus, paralleling the development of the previous sections, we
will derive the optimal dynamic direct mechanism for a revenue maximizing seller. We will show
that revenue maximization in our dynamic setting is achieved by an efficient mechanism applied
to virtual values. We will then discuss the indirect implementation of the revenue maximizing
policy via a sequence of ascending auctions.
5.1. Optimal Direct Mechanism
We consider a single monopolist seller who commits, at time zero, to a dynamic direct mech-
anism M = {xt,pt}t∈N0 .12 The seller’s expected revenue from this mechanism is the expected
discounted sum of payments made by each buyer. Recalling from Equation (2) that the expected
11Researchers interested in keyword auctions for sponsored search have, however, considered the problem of designing
optimal auctions for selling various advertising “slots” on a search engine, where slots are differentiated by their click-
through-rate. See, for instance, Iyengar and Kumar (2006).
12Commitment is necessary so as to ensure that that the revelation principle applies and it is without loss of generality
to consider direct mechanisms.
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payment of a buyer i, conditional on entry, is denoted by mi(vi,ωt), the seller’s payoff may be
written as
Π(M) := E
[
∞
∑
t=0
∑
i∈It
δtαt(i)mi(vi,ωt)
]
,
where αt(i) = 1 if i ∈ It arrives to the market (which occurs with probability pii ∈ [0, 1]) and
αt(i) = 0 otherwise.
Conditional on the arrival of agent i ∈ It in period t, when the current state of the market is
described by ωt ∈ {0, 1}I ×K, her expected payment is given by∫ v¯
0
mi(vi,ωt) fi(vi) dvi.
By applying the revenue equivalence result from Corollary 1, this may be rewritten as
mi(0,ωt) +
∫ v¯
0
qi(vi,ωt)vi fi(vi) dvi −
∫ v¯
0
∫ vi
0
qi(v′i,ωt) fi(vi) dv
′
i dvi.
Applying the standard interchange of the order of integration of the last term above, the expected
payment of buyer i, conditional on entry, is then
mi(0,ωt) +
∫ v¯
0
qi(vi,ωt)ϕi(vi) fi(vi) dvi,
where
ϕi(vi) := vi − 1− Fi(vi)fi(vi)
is the virtual valuation of buyer i with value vi. Recall that we have assumed that ϕi is strictly
increasing in vi for all agents i ∈ I .13 Thus, applying the law of iterated expectations, the revenue-
maximizing seller is faced with the problem of choosing a feasible mechanismM to maximize
Π(M) = E
[
∞
∑
t=0
∑
i∈It
δtαt(i)mi(0,ωt)
]
+E
[
∞
∑
t=0
∑
i∈It
δtαt(i)qi(vi,ωt)ϕi(vi)
]
, (4)
subject to the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints discussed in Lemma 1
and Corollary 1.
Notice that the seller’s objective function above is the sum of two terms: the first term is a
discounted sum of expected payments, while the second is a discounted sum of weighted virtual
values. Moreover, this second term is identical to the efficiency-oriented social planner’s objective
function in Equation (4), except that values have been replaced with virtual values. Therefore, the
insights about the efficient policy carry over to this context. In particular, the revenue-maximizing
policy is again an assortative matching: objects are ordered by their arrival time and buyers are
ordered by their virtual values, and “earlier” objects are allocated to agents with higher virtual
values. Again, this matching must respect the feasibility constraints placed on the allocation rule.
Thus, the revenue-maximizing allocation policy is, in each period, to allocate all available objects
to the buyers currently present on the market that have the highest virtual values. Note, however,
13As previously mentioned, we may use the procedure of Skreta (2007) to define “ironed” virtual values ϕ̂i and use
those in place of ϕi whenever it is not increasing or well-defined.
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that allocating objects to agents with negative virtual values decreases the seller’s payoff. Thus,
the matching described above must restrict attention to buyers with non-negative virtual values.
Before proceeding to the formal description of this policy, some additional definitions are needed.
For any state zt = (ht,ωt, v) ∈ Ht × {0, 1}I ×K ×R, where v denotes truthful reporting by all
agents, we denote by
Api(zt) := {i ∈ At : ϕi(vi) ≥ 0}
the set of all agents present with non-negative virtual values. The set of agents i ∈ Api(zt) whose
virtual value is among the kt highest currently present is given by
Api+(zt) :=
{
i ∈ Api(zt) :
∣∣{j ∈ At : ϕj(vj) ≥ ϕi(vi)}∣∣ ≤ kt} .
Similarly, the set of agents i ∈ Api(zt) whose virtual value is ranked strictly outside the top kt
agents is
Api−(zt) :=
{
i ∈ Api(zt) :
∣∣{j ∈ At : ϕj(vj) > ϕi(vi)}∣∣ ≥ kt} .
Finally,
Api∼(zt) := Api(zt) \
(
Api+(zt)
⋃Api−(zt))
is the set of agents tied for the kt-th highest ranking virtual value. The following characterization
of optimal allocations then follows immediately from combining the observations discussed above
with Lemma 2.
LEMMA 4 (Revenue-maximizing allocation rules).
Suppose all buyers, upon arrival, report their true values. A feasible allocation rule {xt}t∈N0 is optimal
(revenue-maximizing) if, and only if, for all zt = (ht,ωt, v) ∈ Ht × {0, 1}I ×K×R,
xi,t(zt) = 1 for all i ∈ Api+(zt), and
∑
i∈Api∼(zt)
xi,t(zt) = kt − |Api+(zt)| if |Api+(zt)| < kt.
As with the efficient allocation rules described by Lemma 2, all revenue-maximizing allocation
rules agree after almost all histories. The only possible variations are at probability zero histories
in which multiple agents have identical (positive) virtual values.14 Additionally, these allocation
policies are independent of past history, as optimal allocations are functions only of the values of
the agents currently present on the market and on the number of objects currently available.
We will therefore refer to the revenue-maximizing allocation rule x˜. By this, we mean the
revenue-maximizing allocation rule which breaks ties with equal probability, which is defined
by
x˜i,t(ωt, vt) =

1 if i ∈ Api+
0 if i ∈ Api−
kt−|Api+|
|Api∼| if i ∈ A
pi∼
for all ωt ∈ {0, 1}I ×K and vt ∈ VAt , where we drop, for convenience, the dependence on ht.
14As with the efficient policies discussed in Section 3, we (without loss of generality) disregard the zero-probability
events in which an agent’s virtual value is equal to zero.
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It should be clear that the revenue-maximizing allocation rule x˜ satisfies the requirements of
incentive compatibility. From the perspective of a given buyer i ∈ I , x˜ allocates an object to
i after a given history if, and only if, i is among the highest-ranking (by virtual value) buyers
present at that history. Since we have assumed the standard regularity condition of increasing
virtual valuations, x˜i,t is nondecreasing in vi, given the values of the other agents present on the
market. Since this property holds for any arbitrary history and realization of competitors’ values,
it is straightforward to show that the expected discounted probability of receiving an object q˜i is
also nondecreasing in vi. Thus, by choosing an appropriate payment rule, it is possible to design
an incentive compatible mechanism that implements the revenue-maximizing allocation policy.
Let us now examine the first term in the seller’s objective function in Equation (4). Given the
incentive compatibility of the revenue-maximizing allocation policy, the generalization of the rev-
enue equivalence theorem presented in Corollary 1 implies that the individual rationality con-
straint faced by our seller is
mi(0,ωt) ≤ 0
for all i ∈ I and all ωt ∈ {0, 1}I × K. Therefore, since mi enters the seller’s objective function
additively, this constraint must be binding.
The problem of choosing a payment rule that satisfies this constraint in this dynamic setting
is similar to the static optimal auction problem. In the static setting, the Myerson (1981) optimal
mechanism can be reinterpreted as a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. Instead of maximizing
surplus, the revenue-maximizing single-object allocation mechanism maximizes virtual surplus.
When agents report their values vi, the mechanism computes their virtual values ϕi(vi) and then
applies the VCG mechanism to these virtual values. This yields an allocation and a “virtual price”
such that the winning buyer’s virtual value less the virtual price is equal to her marginal contri-
bution to the virtual surplus. We can then invert this virtual price into a “standard” price, which
in the single-object case is the lowest value that could have been reported by the winning buyer
such that she remains the winner.
These insights can be applied in our setting; however, care must be taken to ensure that we
correctly account for the heterogeneous nature of the multiple goods available. In particular, one
cannot simply invert the price charged to winners via the virtual valuation functions to determine
the new prices, as prices will typically be functions of several agents’ values.
So, for each i ∈ I , define
r˜i := ϕ−1i (0).
This is the minimal value required for agent i to potentially receive an object under the revenue-
maximizing allocation policy. Furthermore, for each t ∈ N0 and all i ∈ It, we define for any
ωt ∈ {0, 1}I ×K and truthful vt ∈ VAt the function
Πi(ωt, vt) := E
[
∞
∑
s=t
∑
j∈I
δs−t x˜j,s(ωs, vs)
(
ϕ−1i
(
ϕj(vj)
)− r˜i)
]
. (5)
This expression is the same as the virtual surplus in the seller’s objective function in Equation (4),
except that instead of a weighted sum of virtual values, it is a weighted sum of the corresponding
“real” values of agent i, less the reservation value r˜i applied to agent i; that is, Πi measures the
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virtual surplus in the same units as i’s utility function. Since we have assumed that virtual values
are increasing for all agents, ϕ−1i is increasing. Therefore, transforming the virtual values of all
agents by ϕ−1i preserves their ordering; moreover, ϕ
−1
i (ϕj(vj))− r˜i ≥ 0 if, and only if, ϕj(vj) ≥ 0.
Therefore,
x˜ ∈ arg max
{xs}∞s=t
{
E
[
∞
∑
t=0
∑
j∈It
δtxj,t(ωt, vt)
(
ϕ−1i (ϕj(vi))− r˜i
)]}
;
that is, x˜ is an efficient allocation rule for an environment in which a social planner realizes a
payoff of ϕ−1i (ϕj(vj))− r˜i when allocating an object to agent j with value vj.
Again denoting by ω−is the market state in period s ∈ N0 when buyer i is removed from the
market (that is, where we impose αs(i) = 0), we write
Πi−i(ω
−i
t , vt) := E
 ∞∑
s=t
∑
j∈I\{i}
δs−t x˜j,s(ω−is , vs)
(
ϕ−1i
(
ϕj(vj)
)− r˜i)

for the virtual social welfare (in terms of i’s utility) when i is removed from the market. Thus, the
arrival of agent i ∈ It to the market yields a marginal contribution—again, in units of i’s utility
function—equal to
w˜i(ωt, vt) := Πi(ωt, vt)−Πi−i(ω−it , vt).
We now define the virtual Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism to be the dynamic direct mechanism
M˜ := {x˜t, p˜t}t∈N0 , where x˜ is the revenue-maximizing allocation rule and the payment rule p˜ is
defined by
p˜i,t(ωt, vt) := q˜i(ωt, vt)vi − w˜i(ωt, vt)
upon the arrival of agent i ∈ It in period t, and p˜i,s(ωs, vs) := 0 for all s 6= t. (We denote by q˜i the
expected discounted probability of i receiving an object under the allocation rule x˜.)
PROPOSITION 4 (Virtual VCG is periodic ex post IC and IR).
Suppose that virtual values ϕi are increasing for all i ∈ I . Then the virtual Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mecha-
nism M˜ is periodic ex post incentive compatible and individually rational.
Thus, the virtual VCG mechanism M˜ is an optimal (revenue-maximizing) dynamic direct mech-
anism. However, it is subject to the same criticism that we applied to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanism: M˜ charges each buyer a single payment upon their arrival, even if the agent is not
immediately allocated an object. In the case in which the survival probability γ < 1, this implies
that agents may make a payment but depart the market before receiving an object.
We may compensate for this problem, as we did in the case of efficient mechanisms, by charging
payments such that each agent’s flow utility is equal to her current period contribution to the
virtual surplus. This quantity is defined by
w˜Fi (ωt, vt) := w˜i(ωt, vt)− δE [w˜i(ωt+1, vt+1)]
= Πi(ωt, vt)−Πi−i(ω−it , vt)− δ
(
E
[
Πi(ωt+1, vt+1)
]
−E
[
Πi−i(ω
−i
t+1, vt+1)
])
.
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We define the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism M˜F := {x˜t, p˜Ft }t∈N0 to be the dynamic direct mech-
anism with the optimal allocation rule x˜ and the payment rule p˜F defined by
p˜Fi,t(ωt, vt) := x˜i,t(ωt, vt)vi − w˜Fi (ωt, vt)
for all (ωt, vt). As with the dynamic pivot mechanism discussed earlier, the dynamic virtual pivot
mechanism does not require agents to make any transfers in periods where they are not allocated
an object. If i does not receive an object, either ϕi(vi) < 0 or there are sufficiently many agents
with higher virtual values currently present on the market. In the first case, i’s presence does
not affect the allocation to any other agent, and hence her contribution is identically zero. If, on
the other hand, the latter is true, then removing i from the market will not affect the current-
period allocation, and hence i’s flow contribution is zero. It should also be clear that, if agent i
does receive an object, her flow marginal contribution to the virtual surplus is equal to her total
marginal contribution, as she will no longer be present in the future.
Moreover, the expectation of a discounted sum of flow marginal contributions is equal to the
total marginal contribution. Therefore, we have the following observation, which we state here
without proof.
COROLLARY 3 (Dynamic virtual pivot mechanism is periodic ex post IC and IR).
Suppose that virtual values ϕi are increasing for all i ∈ I . Then the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism M˜F
is periodic ex post incentive compatible and individually rational.
As with the case of optimal mechanisms in static settings, there is a clear tradeoff between
revenue and efficiency. The inefficiency of the revenue-maximizing mechanism stems from two
sources. First, there are buyers who, despite having positive values for an object, never receive
one. The second source of inefficiency enters due to the discriminatory nature of virtual values: a
buyer with a higher value may have the timing of her allocation delayed because of the presence
of a buyer with a lower value but higher virtual value.
This second source of inefficiency disappears in the symmetric case in which all buyers’ values
are drawn from the same distribution F. In this case, each buyer is faced with the same reserva-
tion value r˜i = r˜ := ϕ−1(0), and the ordering of virtual values agrees with the ordering of actual
values. Moreover, the revenue-maximizing allocation rule becomes quasi-efficient, in the sense
that it allocates objects efficiently among the subset of agents with values greater than the reserve
value r˜. In addition, an agent’s marginal contribution to the virtual surplus in this case may be
reinterpreted in terms of social welfare. Recall that agent i’s marginal contribution to the social
welfare is the total surplus when i is present less the total surplus when she is absent. Since a buyer
with value 0 does not provide (or remove) any surplus from the market, the total surplus when
i is absent is unchanged when we add a “null” buyer with value zero. Therefore, i’s marginal
contribution may also be viewed as her “social replacement value,” where instead of removing
i from the market entirely, she is simply replaced with an agent whose value is 0. Analogously,
i’s contribution to the virtual surplus w˜i is her replacement value, where instead of replacing i
with an agent whose value is 0, we replace her with an agent whose value is equal to the reser-
vation price r˜. With this in mind, the link between optimal mechanisms and efficient VCG-like
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mechanisms should not be surprising. In a static setting, Krishna and Perry (2000) show that the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is revenue-maximizing among all mechanisms that are effi-
cient, individually rational, and incentive compatible. Cavallo (2008) proves a similar result: in
a dynamic setting with a fixed agent population and changing types, the dynamic pivot mech-
anism is revenue maximizing among the class of efficient, individually rational, and periodic ex
post incentive compatible dynamic mechanisms. Therefore, when revenue maximization requires
a quasi-efficient allocation, a pivot mechanism with an appropriately chosen reserve is optimal.
5.2. Optimal Sequential Auction
In light of the previous observation and the results of Section 3, when values are independently
and identically drawn from the same distribution F, a natural candidate for a revenue maximizing
auction is the sequential ascending auction. It is well-known that in a static setting with K units
of a homogenous good to be allocated, efficiency is achievable by a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mech-
anism. This mechanism is outcome equivalent to a K-th price sealed-bid or ascending auction. As
established by Myerson (1981) in the case of a single object, and by Maskin and Riley (1989) with
multiple units of a homogenous good, the revenue-maximizing mechanism is a pivot mechanism
with a reserve price equal to r˜ := ϕ−1(0). This mechanism is again outcome equivalent to a K-th-
price sealed-bid or ascending auction with a reserve price equal to r˜. In our dynamic setting with
randomly arriving and departing buyers, both the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and the dy-
namic pivot mechanism are efficient. Moreover, the outcome of the dynamic pivot mechanism
may be implemented via a sequence of ascending auctions. Reasoning by analogy, we may con-
clude that, since the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism is revenue maximizing and corresponds to
the dynamic pivot mechanism with a reserve of r˜, a sequence of ascending auctions with reserve
price r˜ is the corresponding revenue-maximizing auction.
Let us formalize this analogy. We again make use of the multi-unit, uniform-price variant of the
Milgrom and Weber (1982) button model of ascending auctions. However, we introduce a reserve
price equal to r˜. For notational convenience, we will assume that the price clock starts at zero
and rises continuously.15 When there are m ≥ 1 units available in a given period, the auction will
end whenever there are at most m bidders still active and the price is at least r˜. At that time, each
remaining bidder receives an object and pays the price at which the auction ended. As before, ties
are broken fairly.
Recall that we denote by nt := At the number of buyers present in period t. Also recall that,
taking the perspective of an arbitrary bidder i, we let
yt := (y1t , . . . , y
nt−1
t )
denote the ordered valuations of all other buyers present in period t, where y1t is the largest value
and ynt−1t is the smallest. For each m = 1, . . . , nt − 1, we define
v¯m := (v¯, . . . , v¯) ∈ Vm and y>mt := (ym+1t , . . . , ynt−1t ).
15Alternately, one could model each auction as a two-stage game in which buyers first make a participation decision
for the current-period auction, and then the price clock starts at r˜.
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Finally, we define, for each m = 1, . . . , nt − 1,
w˜t+1(ωt, vi, y>mt ) := δE [w˜i(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, y>mt )] .
This is the (discounted) expected future marginal contribution of an agent i ∈ At to the virtual
surplus, conditional on the period-t presence of m competitors with the highest possible value
v¯ and nt − m − 1 buyers ranked below i with values y>mt . Recall from the previous discussion,
however, that this is exactly i’s expected contribution to the social welfare over a replacement
agent with value r˜; moreover, note that w˜t+1(ωt, vi, y>mt ) = 0 for all buyers with values vi ≤ r˜,
regardless of the realization of y>mt .
In each period t ∈ N0, we assume that each agent i ∈ At bids up to the cutoffs β˜tm,nt whenever
she has m active competitors in the auction, where
β˜tm,nt(ωt, vi, y
>m
t ) := vi − w˜t+1(ωt, vi, y>mt ). (6)
These (symmetric across agents) cutoffs are strictly increasing in vi, implying that buyers can infer
the values of those competitors that have already exited the auction. Note that when buyer i is
active, and she knows the values y>mt of her opponents that are no longer active, the price at which
she is indifferent between winning an object and receiving her discounted marginal contribution
in the next period (conditional on all remaining active buyers having values greater than hers) is
exactly β˜tm,nt .
We may then use arguments similar to those of Lemma 3, Proposition 2, and Proposition 3 to
prove the following result.
PROPOSITION 5 (Revenue maximization via sequential ascending auctions).
Suppose that Fi = F for all i ∈ I . Then following the bidding strategies β˜tm,nt in Equation (6) in every
period of the sequential ascending auction mechanism with reserve price r˜ := ϕ−1(0) is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium that is outcome equivalent to the truth-telling equilibrium of the dynamic virtual pivot mecha-
nism.16
Proposition 5 therefore implies that the sequential ascending auction with a reserve price ad-
mits an equilibrium with prices and allocations identical to those of the dynamic virtual pivot
mechanism. Therefore, as was the case in Section 3, we find that a monopolist who wishes to max-
imize revenues while making use of a transparent, decentralized mechanism may do so by using
a sequence of ascending auctions. Moreover, the method of proof of the proposition above shows
that the strategy profile specified in Equation (6) forms a periodic ex post equilibrium. Given ex-
pectations about future arrivals and behavior, each buyer’s current period bid is a best response
to the strategies of her opponents, regardless of the realization of their values or the history of the
mechanism.
16In the case where buyers’ values are not drawn from the same distribution, a sequence of ascending auctions will
again admit an equilibrium that is outcome equivalent to the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism, with the proviso that
buyers’ price clocks run asynchronously at speeds corresponding to the rate of change in their virtual value functions.
Such an auction corresponds to the Myerson (1981) optimal auction—see Proposition 1 of Caillaud and Robert (2005).
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6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine a private-values, single-unit-demand environment where buyers and
objects arrive at random times. We show that the efficient allocation policy may be implemented
by using a dynamic variant of the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. Moreover, by gen-
eralizing the static Myerson (1981) payoff- and revenue-equivalence results to our setting, we are
able to derive a revenue-maximizing direct mechanism. This mechanism succeeds in maximizing
a seller’s profits by applying an efficient dynamic pivot mechanism to buyers’ virtual values.
We also examine indirect mechanisms in this setting, finding that a sequence of ascending auc-
tions serves as a natural and intuitive institution that corresponds to the direct mechanisms de-
scribed above. This open auction format allows each buyer to learn her competitors’ values, and
hence determine her own marginal contribution to the social welfare. When each buyer exits each
auction at the price such that she is indifferent between winning the object and obtaining her
future marginal contribution, we obtain a decentralized price discovery mechanism that yields
outcomes identical to those of the centralized direct mechanisms.
These results set the stage for several additional avenues of inquiry. For instance, suppose that
objects need not be allocated in the period of their arrival, but can instead be placed in inventory
and allocated in future periods. Such a situation provides a seller with an additional strategic tool:
the ability to withhold an item in the current period in hopes of “better” demand in future periods.
While some properties of our solution are maintained (for instance, the efficient policy continues to
allocate objects to higher-ranked buyers before moving onto competitors with lower values, and a
dynamic VCG mechanism will continue to be efficient), the indirect implementation results do not
follow immediately. For example, in the case of storable objects, the sale of an object to a particular
agent imposes an additional externality on her competitors, as the number of objects available
in the future decreases. This reduces the incentives for buyers to truthfully reveal their private
information, as this information may be of great strategic value to competitors. Moreover, reserve
prices are necessary even for achieving efficient outcomes, and the natumannerre in which these
reserve prices fluctuate over time with changes in supply will be a crucial factor in the possibility
of attaining efficient outcomes via an auction mechanism.
Another natural extension of our model is the generalization to the case in which agents may de-
mand multiple units. This, however, introduces additional intertemporal tradeoffs in any auction
mechanism, as expected future payoffs in individual valuations are no longer identical functions
of individual values when buyers have differential demands. While informational asymmetries
may be resolved via information renewal and memoryless strategies, such strategies cannot re-
solve the fundamental asymmetry in objectives that arise when some buyers have already satis-
fied a portion of their demand. An alternative line of research relaxes the assumption that buyer
entries and exits are exogenous, instead allowing buyers to condition their participation on mar-
ket conditions. Such a model would provide an important building block to an understanding of
competing marketplaces and platforms. We leave these questions, however, for future work.
30
AUCTIONS WITH DYNAMIC POPULATIONS: EFFICIENCY AND REVENUE MAXIMIZATION
APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. We first show the necessity of the three conditions for incentive compati-
bility and individual rationality. So, suppose that the mechanismM is both incentive compatible
and individually rational. Fix any t ∈ N0, any i ∈ It, and arbitrary ωt ∈ {0, 1}I × K. Then
incentive compatibility implies that, for all vi ∈ V,
Ûi(vi,ωt) = max
v′i∈V
{
qi(v′i,ωt)vi −mi(v′i,ωt)
}
.
Thus, Ûi(vi, ·) is an affine maximizer, and is hence a convex function of vi. Moreover, for all
vi, v′i ∈ V, incentive compatibility is equivalent to
Ûi(v′i,ωt) ≥ qi(vi,ωt)v′i −mi(vi,ωt)
= qi(vi,ωt)vi −mi(vi,ωt) + qi(vi,ωt)(v′i − vi)
= Ûi(vi,ωt) + qi(vi,ωt)(v′i − vi).
Thus, qi(vi, ·) is a subderivative of Ûi(vi, ·) at vi. Since Ûi(vi, ·) is convex in vi, it is absolutely
continuous and hence differentiable almost everywhere, implying that at every point of differen-
tiability,
∂
∂vi
Ûi(vi,ωt) = qi(vi,ωt).
Since Ûi(vi, ·) is convex, this implies that qi must be nondecreasing in vi.
Moreover, every absolutely continuous function is equal to the definite integral of its derivative,
implying that
Ûi(vi,ωt) = Ûi(0,ωt) +
∫ vi
0
qi(v′i,ωt) dv
′
i
for all vi ∈ V. Finally, since qi is nondecreasing in vi, the requirement of individual rationality is
then satisfied for all vi only if
Ûi(0,ωt) ≥ 0.
Hence, the three conditions are necessary conditions forM to be incentive compatible and indi-
vidually rational.
We now show the sufficiency of the three conditions for incentive compatibility and individual
rationality. Suppose that M satisfies the three conditions, and fix any t ∈ N0, any i ∈ It, and
arbitrary ωt ∈ {0, 1}I ×K. Note first that qi is nondecreasing in vi and Ûi(0,ωt) ≥ 0 immediately
imply that Ûi(vi,ωt) ≥ 0 for all vi ∈ V, and soM is individually rational.
Now, for any vi, v′i ∈ V, the second condition implies that
Ûi(v′i,ωt) = Ûi(vi,ωt) +
∫ v′i
vi
qi(v′′i ,ωt) dv
′′
i .
If vi < v′i, then qi nondecreasing implies that qi(vi,ωt) ≤ qi(v′i,ωt). Thus,
Ûi(v′i,ωt) ≥ Ûi(vi,ωt) + qi(vi,ωt)(v′i − vi).
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Similarly, if vi > v′i, then qi nondecreasing implies that qi(vi,ωt) ≥ qi(v′i,ωt). Therefore,
Ûi(v′i,ωt) = Ûi(vi,ωt)−
∫ vi
v′i
qi(v′′i ,ωt) dv
′′
i
≥ Ûi(vi,ωt)− qi(vi,ωt)(vi − v′i) = Ûi(vi,ωt) + qi(vi,ωt)(v′i − vi).
However, this inequality is, as shown above, equivalent to incentive compatibility. Since vi, v′i ∈ V
were chosen arbitrarily, this implies thatM is incentive compatible. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2.17 Note first that any two allocation rule that satisfy the conditions of the
lemma yield the same expected payoff to the social planner. To see this, note that the only variation
permitted is in the allocation of objects to agents with zero valuation and in the breaking of ties.
Given the allocations to all other agents, choosing to allocate to agents with value zero yields
neither an increase nor decrease in the realized surplus. Moreover, although the second condition
regarding the allocation to agents in A∼ allows for various mixtures over this set of agents, the
outcome of these mixtures is always the same: exactly kt − |A+| of these agents receive an object.
Different choices among these outcomes does not affect future payoffs, as the arrival process of
agents and objects is orthogonal to these allocative decisions, and all agents depart the system at
the same exogenously given rate 1− γ.
With this in mind, let x̂ denote a deterministic allocation rule that allocates an object to the
highest-ranking agents (including those with value equal to zero), where ties are broken arbitrarily
(but without randomization). Fix any policy x0 that yields the planner a strictly higher payoff than
the policy x̂, and define
Z0 :=
{
(ht,ωt) ∈ H× {0, 1}I ×K : x0(z) 6= x̂(z), x0(z′) = x̂(z′) for all z′ → z
}
.
Thus, Z0 is the set of all histories and arrivals z such that x0 and x̂ disagree at z, but agree on all
of z’s prefixes; that is, Z0 is the set of “first” or “earliest” disagreements between x0 and x̂. Since
x0 does strictly better than x̂, this set must have nonzero measure (with respect to the measure
induced by the arrival processes), as otherwise the two policies would agree almost everywhere
(and hence yield identical payoffs).
For each z ∈ Z0, note that the policy x0 induces a probability distribution over outcomes, where
an outcome is an assignment of objects to agents. Denote by Σ0(z) the set of outcomes induced
by x0 at history z. Thus, an outcome σ ∈ Σ0(z) is associated with a subset of buyers present that
receive an object. Let aj(σ) denote the j-th highest-valued agent that receives an object under x0 in
outcome σ. Similarly, let bj(z) denote the j-th highest-valued agent overall.
Define for each z ∈ Z0 and for each σ ∈ Σ0(z), we define the “continuation policy” xσ1 (z) to
be the allocation rule that allocates to the highest-ranking agents present at time z, and is equal to
x0 at all successors of z except that it allocates to agent aj(σ) whenever x0 allocates to agent bj(z).
Thus, xσ1 (z) is the same as x0 except that it “swaps” the allocation decisions of aj(σ) and bj(z).
Since vaj(σ) ≤ vbj(z) (with a strict inequality for at least one j), the expected payoff to the planner
under xσ1 is greater than that of x0 along this branch of the mechanism tree. To see why this is true,
17Thanks are due to Larry Samuelson for suggesting the method of proof used below.
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consider any v > v′ and t < t′. Since δ < 1, we have
(δtv + δt
′
v′)− (δtv′ + δt′v) = (δt − δt′)(v− v′) > 0.
Thus, even if agents do not depart the market, the planner’s payoff along this path is increases.
Thus, define the allocation policy x1 to be equal to x0 at all histories that are not successors to
histories in Z0. Furthermore, for each z ∈ Z0, we define x1(z) to be the stochastic policy that
chooses xσ1 (z) with the probability that x0 leads to outcome σ. Since this leads to an increase in
the planner’s payoff over x0 along every successor history to those in Z0, and this set has positive
measure, it must be the case that x1 yields a strictly greater payoff that x0.
If x1 yields the planner a payoff less than or equal to that of x̂, transitivity of the planner’s
payoffs leads to a contradiction, implying that there does not exist a policy x0 such that x0 does
strictly better than x̂, and hence that x̂ is optimal.
On the other hand, if x1 yields a payoff greater than that of x̂, we define the set
Z1 :=
{
(ht,ωt) ∈ H× {0, 1}I ×K : x1(z) 6= x̂(z), x1(z′) = x̂(z′) for all z′ → z
}
to be the set of x1’s “first disagreements” with x̂. We may repeat the procedure above to then
define a new policy x2 that agrees with x̂ at every z ∈ Z1, but does strictly better than either x1.
Notice that, if x1 does better than x̂, then we have arrived at a contradiction.
Proceeding in this manner, we construct a sequence of policies {xs}∞s=0 with associated expected
payoffs {Ws}∞t=0 such that Ws < Ws+1 for all s ∈ N0. Note, however, that for all s ∈ N0, xs agrees
with x̂ on at least all histories of length s. Since δs approaches zero as s becomes increasingly large,
this implies that
lim
s→∞Ws = Ŵ,
where Ŵ is the planner’s expected payoff from following policy x̂. Moreover, since {Ws} is an
increasing sequence, this implies that
Ŵ ≥Ws for all s ∈N0,
a contradiction. It must therefore be the case that there does not exist a policy x0 that yields the
planner a strictly higher payoff than x̂. Therefore, we may conclude that x̂ is, in fact, a socially
optimal policy. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. As already established, the discounted expected probability of re-
ceiving an object under the efficient allocation rule qˆi(vi,ωt) is nondecreasing in vi. Given the
result of Lemma 1, this implies that the VCG mechanism is incentive compatible. To see that it is
individually rational, note that
Ûi(vi,ωt) = qˆi(vi,ωt)vi − mˆi(vi,ωt) = E [wi(ωt, vt)] ,
where the expectation is taken with respect the values of agents j ∈ At \ {i}. However, since the
social planner always has available to her the option of ignoring i’s presence on the market (which
imposes no externalities on the other agents), i’s marginal contribution to the social welfare must
be nonnegative. Thus, Ûi(vi,ωt) ≥ 0, implying that M̂ is individually rational.
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In order to show that truth-telling is a periodic ex post optimal strategy for all agents, fix an
arbitrary agent i ∈ It for arbitrary t ∈N0, and suppose that i knows the reported values vt−i of all
agents other than i who are also on the market at time t. Then, by reporting a value v′i upon her
arrival in state ωt, agent i’s payoff under the VCG mechanism is(
xˆi,t(ωt, (v′i, v
t
−i)) +E
[
∑
s>t
δs−t xˆi,s(ωs, (v′i, v
s
−i))
])
(vi − v′i) + wi(ωt, (v′i, vt−i))
= E
[
∞
∑
s=t
∑
j∈I
δs−t xˆj,s(ωs, (v′i, v
s
−i))vj
]
−W−i(ω−it , vt−i),
where the expectation is taken with respect to the true distributions of values for agents arriving
in periods s > t. Since x̂ is the efficient policy, the first term above is maximized by setting v′i = vi.
Moreover, the second term does not depend on v′i. Hence, i’s expected payoff is maximized by
truthful reporting of her value, regardless of the reports of the other agents present or the state
upon i’s arrival; that is, given the truth-telling behavior of agents arriving in every future period,
truthful reporting is optimal regardless of the realizations of all other agents already present on
the market. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3. Fix an arbitrary period t ∈ N0, and let ωt := (αt, kt) denote the state of the
market at time t. Consider an agent i ∈ At with value vi, and suppose that nt−m− 1 buyers have
dropped out of the period-t auction, revealing values y>mt , where m ∈ {1, . . . , nt − 1}. We wish to
show first that vi > vj > ym+1t implies that
β̂tm,nt(ωt, vi, y
>m
t ) := vi − wt+1(ωt, vi, y>mt ) > vj − wt+1(ωt, vj, y>mt ) =: β̂tm,nt(ωt, vj, y>mt ).
Notice that wt+1(ωt, vj, y>mt )− wt+1(ωt, vi, y>mt ) =
δE
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vj, y>mt )
]
− δE
[
W−j(ω
−j
t+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vj, y>mt )
]
− δE
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
+ δE
[
W−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
= δE
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vj, y>mt )
]
− δE
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
,
since removing either i or j in the following period, conditional on their being the m-th highest-
ranked agent, does not differentially affect the order of anticipated future allocations to any other
agents. In particular, since the the efficient allocation rule x̂ makes assignments based solely on
the ranking of valuations, it will choose the same assignments in future periods when i or j have
been removed from the market.
Moreover, by naïvely treating buyer j as though her true value were vi, we can provide a bound
on the difference above. In particular, we have
δE
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vj, y>mt )
]
− δE
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
≥ E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
δs−t xˆi,s(ωs, vs)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
(vj − vi).
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Thus, if vi > vj, then
β̂tm,nt(ωt, vi, y
>m
t )− β̂tm,nt(ωt, vi, y>mt )
≥ (vi − vj)
(
1−E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
δs−t xˆi,s(ωs, vs)|vt = (v¯m, vi, y>mt )
])
> 0
since the discounted expected probability of receiving an object in the future is bounded above by
δ < 1. Thus, β̂tm,nt(ωt, vi, y
>m
t ) is strictly increasing in vi.
Also, note that if vi > vj = ym+1t , then w
t+1(ωt, vj, y>m+1t )− wt+1(ωt, vi, vj, y>m+1t ) =
δ
(
E
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m+1, vj, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
W(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
])
− δ
(
E
[
W−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
W−j(ω
−j
t+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m+1, vj, y>m+1t )
])
.
However, the second difference above may be rewritten as
E
[
W−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
W−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vi, y>m+1t )
]
+E
[
W−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vi, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
W−j(ω
−j
t+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m+1, vj, y>m+1t )
]
.
Thus,
wt+1(ωt, vj, y>m+1t )− wt+1(ωt, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
is the sum of three differences. The first is the expected gain in social welfare when increasing i’s
value from vi to v¯. The second is the expected gain in social welfare (when i is not on the market)
from increasing j’s value from vj to vi. Finally, the third difference is the expected loss in social
welfare (when j is not present) from decreasing i’s value from v¯ to vi. However, since vj < vi, the
presence or absence of j from the market has no influence on when the efficient policy allocates to
i, regardless of whether i’s value is vi or v¯. Therefore, the gain from the first difference equals the
loss from the third difference, implying that
wt+1(ωt, vj, y>m+1t )− wt+1(ωt, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
= δ
(
E
[
W−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
W−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vi, y>m+1t )
])
.
Moreover, by (again) naïvely treating buyer j as though her true value were vi, we can provide a
bound on the difference above, which may be used to show that
β̂tm,nt(ωt, vi, vj, y
>m+1
t )− β̂tm+1,nt(ωt, vj, y>m+1t ) > 0.
Thus, the exit of the buyer with rank (m + 1) does not induce the immediate exit of any buyer
with a higher value. Therefore, since β̂tm,nt(ωt, vi, vj, y
>m+1
t ) is strictly increasing in vi, the price at
which this exit occurs fully reveals the value of the (m + 1)-th highest-ranked buyer.
Since m was arbitrarily chosen, this implies that the drop-out points of buyers bidding accord-
ing to Equation (3) are fully revealing of the buyers’ values. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Fix an arbitrary period t ∈ N0, and let kt denote the number of
objects present, and nt := |At| denote the number of agents present. As discussed above, the
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bidding strategies β̂tm,nt are strictly increasing; therefore, the multi-unit uniform-price ascending
auction ends allocates the kt objects to the group of buyers with the kt highest values. Recall that if
kt ≥ nt, the auction ends immediately, and all buyers present receive an object for free. Similarly,
in the dynamic pivot mechanism, each buyer i receives an object, and makes a payment pˆFi,t given
by
pˆFi,t(ωt, vt) = vi − wFi (ωt, vt),
where wFi is the agent’s marginal contribution to the social welfare. Note that since i is receiving
an object, her total and flow marginal contributions are equal. However, since there are sufficient
objects present for each agent to receive one, i does not impose any externalities on the remaining
agents; thus,
wFi (ωt, vt) = wi(ωt, vt) = vi,
implying that pˆFi,t(ωt, vt) = 0. In this case, then, the allocation and payments of the auction mech-
anism and the dynamic pivot mechanism are the same.
Suppose instead that kt < nt; that is, there are more agents present than objects. Denote by im
the bidder with the m-th highest value. Then each agent who receives an object pays the price at
which buyer ikt+1 drops out of the auction, which is given by
β̂tkt+1,nt(ωt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ) = vikt+1 − wt+1(ωt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ).
In the dynamic pivot mechanism, on the other hand, each agent i who receives an object pays
pˆFi,t(ωt, vt) = vi − wFi (ωt, vt)
= vi −E
[
∞
∑
s=t
∑
j∈I
δs−t xˆj,s(ωs, vs)vj
]
+E
 ∞∑
s=t
∑
j∈I\{i}
δs−t xˆj,s(ω−is , vs)vj

= vi −
(
kt
∑
m=1
vm +E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
∑
j∈I
δs−t xˆj,s(ωs, vs)vj
])
+
(
kt
∑
m=1
vm + (vikt+1 − vi) +E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
∑
j∈I
δs−t xˆj,s(ω
−i,−ikt+1
s , vs)vj
])
= vikt+1 −E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
∑
j∈I
δs−t xˆj,s(ωs, vs)vj
]
+E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
∑
j∈I
δs−t xˆj,s(ω
−i,−ikt+1
s , vs)vj
]
= vikt+1 − wt+1(ωt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ),
where the final equality follows from the fact that wt+1(ωt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ) is defined to be the ex-
pected future marginal contribution of the agent with the (kt + 1)-th highest value, conditional on
agents with higher values (which includes i) receiving an object today.
Thus, following the bidding strategies β̂tm,nt leads to period-t prices and allocations identical to
those of the dynamic pivot mechanism. Since the period t was arbitrary, as was the state ωt, this
equivalence holds after each history. Thus, the two mechanisms are outcome equivalent. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. We prove this proposition by making use of the one-shot deviation
principle. Consider any period with nt := |At| buyers on the market and kt objects present.
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Suppose that all bidders other than player i are using the conjectured equilibrium strategies. We
must show that bidder i has no profitable one-shot deviations from the collection of cutoff points
{β̂tm,nt}. More specifically, we must show that i does not wish to exit the auction earlier than
prescribed, nor does she wish to remain active later than specified.
Once again labeling agents such that buyer i1 has the highest value and buyer int has the lowest,
note that if vi < vikt , bidding according to {β̂tm,nt} implies that i does not win an object in the
current period. Therefore, exiting earlier than specified does not affect i’s current-period returns.
Moreover, since the bidding strategies are memoryless, neither future behavior by i’s competitors
nor i’s future payoffs will be affected by an early exit. Suppose, on the other hand, that i has
one of the kt highest values; that is, that vi ≥ vikt . As established by Proposition 2, i receives
an object, paying a price such that her payoff is exactly equal to her marginal contribution to the
social welfare. Deviating to an early exit, however, leads to agent ikt+1 winning an object instead
of buyer i. Moreover, i’s expected payoff is then wt+1(ωt, vi, vikt+2 , . . . , vint ), which we defined as
i’s future expected marginal contribution. This is a profitable one-shot deviation for i if, and only
if,
wt+1(ωt, vi, vikt+2 , . . . , vint ) ≥ vi − β̂tkt,nt(ωt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ).
Rearranging this inequality yields
β̂tkt,nt(ωt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ) ≥ vi − wt+1(ωt, vi, vikt+2 , . . . , vint ) = β̂tkt,nt(ωt, vi, vikt+2 , . . . , vint ),
where the equality comes from the definition of β̂tkt,nt in Equation (3). Since vi > vikt+1 , this contra-
dicts the conclusion of Lemma 3. Thus, i does not wish to exit the auction early.
Alternately, if vi ≥ vikt , then planning to remain active in the auction longer than specified does
not change i’s payoffs, as i will win an object regardless. If, on the other hand, vi < vikt , then
delaying exit from the period-t auction can affect i’s payoffs. Since bids in future periods do not
depend on information revealed in the current period, this only occurs if i remains in the auction
long enough to win an object. If i wins, she pays a price equal to the exit point of ivkt , whereas if
she exits, she receives as her continuation payoff her marginal contribution to the social welfare.
So, suppose that i = im for some m > kt. Then a deviation to remaining active in the auction is
profitable if, and only if,
vm − β̂tkt,nt(ωt, vikt , . . . , vim−1 , vm+1, . . . , vint ) ≥ wt+1(ωt, vm, . . . , vint ).
Rearranging this inequality yields
β̂tkt,nt(ωt, vikt , . . . , vim−1 , vm+1, . . . , vint ) ≤ vm − wt+1(ωt, vm, . . . , vint ) = β̂tm−1,nt(ωt, vm, . . . , vint ),
where the equality comes from the definition of β̂tm−1,nt in Equation (3). As above, the fact that
vm < vikt contradicts the conclusion of Lemma 3. Therefore, i does not desire to remain active in
the auction long enough to receive an object.
Thus, we have shown that no player has any incentive to deviate from the prescribed strategies
when on the equilibrium path. In particular, using the bidding strategies β̂tm,nt is sequentially ra-
tional given players’ beliefs along the equilibrium path. Recall, however, that we have specified
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off-equilibrium beliefs such that buyers “ignore” their past observations when they observe a de-
viation from equilibrium play, updating their beliefs to place full probability on the valuation that
rationalizes the deviation; they believe that the deviating agent is currently being truthful with re-
gards to the strategies β̂tm,nt . The argument above then implies that continuing to bid according to
the specified strategies remains sequentially rational with respect to these updated beliefs. Thus,
bidding according to the cutoffs in Equation (3) is optimal along the entire game tree: this strategy
profile forms a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential ascending auction mechanism. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. As discussed within the text, the discounted expected probability of
receiving an object under the revenue-maximizing allocation policy q˜i(vi,ωt) is nondecreasing in
vi, implying that the virtual VCG mechanism is incentive compatible. To see that it is individually
rational, note that the expected utility from participating in the mechanism of an agent i with
value vi = 0 is
Ûi(0,ωt) = −m˜i(0,ωt) = E [w˜i(ωt, vt)|vi = 0] ,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the values of agents j ∈ At \ {i}. However, since
ϕi(0) = − 1fi(0) < 0,
the revenue-maximizing allocation rule never allocates an object to agent i. Therefore, the optimal
policy yields exactly the same outcome whether or not i is present, implying that w˜i = 0 regardless
of the realizations of other buyers’ values. Thus, by Lemma 1, M̂ is individually rational.
In order to show that truth-telling is a periodic ex post optimal strategy for all agents, fix an
arbitrary agent i ∈ It for arbitrary t ∈N0, and suppose that i knows the reported values vt−i of all
agents other than i who are also on the market at time t. Then, by reporting a value v′i upon her
arrival in state ωt, agent i’s payoff under the VCG mechanism is(
x˜i,t(ωt, (v′i, v
t
−i)) +E
[
∑
s>t
δs−t x˜i,s(ωs, (v′i, v
s
−i))
])
(vi − v′i) + w˜i(ωt, (v′i, vt−i))
= E
[
∞
∑
s=t
∑
j∈I
δs−t x˜j,s(ωs, (v′i, v
s
−i))
(
ϕ−1i (ϕj(vj))− r˜i
)]
−Πi−i(ω−it , vt−i),
where the expectation is taken with respect to the true distributions of values for agents arriving in
periods s > t. Since x˜ is an efficient policy for maximizing the above sum of “transformed” virtual
values, the first term above is maximized by setting v′i = vi. Moreover, the second term does
not depend on v′i. Hence, i’s expected payoff is maximized by truthful reporting of her value,
regardless of the reports of the other agents present or the state upon i’s arrival; that is, given
the truth-telling behavior of agents arriving in every future period, truthful reporting is optimal
regardless of the realizations of all other agents already present on the market. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. The proof of this proposition parallels the developments of Section 4.
In particular, we will first show that bids are monotone and fully revealing, as in Lemma 3. Then,
we will show that following the postulated bidding strategies leads to an identical outcome as the
dynamic virtual pivot mechanism in a manner similar to the proof of Proposition 2. Finally, we
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will, analogously to Proposition 3, show that these strategies do, in fact, form a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the sequential auction mechanism.
CLAIM. The bid functions β˜tm,nt(ωt, vi, y
>m
t ) are increasing in vi for all m = 1, . . . , nt − 1. Moreover, if
vi > ym+1t , then
β˜tm,nt(ωt, vi, y
>m
t ) > β˜
t
m+1,nt(ωt, y
>m
t ).
PROOF OF CLAIM. Fix an arbitrary period t ∈ N0, and let αt and kt indicate the set of agents and
objects present on the market, respectively. Consider an agent i ∈ At with value vi, and suppose
that nt − m − 1 buyers have dropped out of the period-t auction, revealing values y>mt , where
nt := |At| is the number of agents present, and m ∈ {1, . . . , nt − 1}. We wish to show first that
vi > vj > ym+1t implies that
β˜tm,nt(ωt, vi, y
>m
t ) := vi − w˜t+1(ωt, vi, y>mt ) > vj − w˜t+1(ωt, vj, y>mt ) =: β˜tm,nt(ωt, vj, y>mt ).
Notice that
w˜t+1(ωt, vj, y>mt )− w˜t+1(ωt, vi, y>mt )
= δE
[
Π(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vj, y>mt )
]
− δE
[
Π−j(ω
−j
t+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vj, y>mt )
]
− δE
[
Π(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
+ δE
[
Π−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
.
This, however, is equal to
δE
[
Π(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vj, y>mt )
]
− δE
[
Π(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
,
since removing either i or j in the following period, conditional on their being the m-th highest-
ranked agent, does not differentially affect the order of anticipated future allocations to any other
agents. In particular, since the the revenue-maximizing allocation rule x˜ makes assignments based
solely on the ranking of valuations, it will choose the same assignments in future periods when i
or j have been removed from the market.
Moreover, by naïvely treating buyer j as though her true value were vi, we can provide a bound
on the difference above. In particular, we have
δE
[
Π(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vj, y>mt )
]
≥ δE
[
Π(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
+E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
δs−t x˜i,s(ωs, vs)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
(vj − vi).
Thus, if vi > vj, then
β˜tm,nt(ωt, vi, y
>m
t )− β˜tm,nt(ωt, vi, y>mt )
≥ (vi − vj)
(
1−E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
δs−t x˜i,s(ωs, vs)|vt = (v¯m, vi, y>mt )
])
> 0
since the discounted expected probability of receiving an object in the future is bounded above by
δ < 1. Thus, β˜tm,nt(ωt, vi, y
>m
t ) is strictly increasing in vi.
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Additionally, note that if vi > vj = ym+1t , then
w˜t+1(ωt, vj, y>m+1t )− w˜t+1(ωt, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
= δ
(
E
[
Π(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m+1, vj, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
Π(ωt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
])
− δ
(
E
[
Π−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
Π−j(ω
−j
t+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m+1, vj, y>m+1t )
])
.
However, the second difference above may be rewritten as
E
[
Π−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
Π−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vi, y>m+1t )
]
+E
[
Π−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vi, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
Π−j(ω
−j
t+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m+1, vj, y>m+1t )
]
.
Thus,
w˜t+1(ωt, vj, y>m+1t )− w˜t+1(ωt, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
is the sum of three differences. The first is the expected gain in virtual surplus when increasing i’s
value from vi to v¯. The second is the expected gain in virtual surplus (when i is not on the market)
from increasing j’s value from vj to vi. Finally, the third difference is the expected loss in virtual
surplus (when j is not present) from decreasing i’s value from v¯ to vi. However, since vj < vi,
the presence or absence of j from the market has no influence on when the optimal (revenue-
maximizing) policy allocates to i, regardless of whether i’s value is vi or v¯. Therefore, the gain
from the first difference equals the loss from the third difference, implying that
w˜t+1(ωt, vj, y>m+1t )− w˜t+1(ωt, vi, vj, y>m+1t ) = δ
(
E
[
Π−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
Π−i(ω−it+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vi, y>m+1t )
])
.
Moreover, by (again) naïvely treating buyer j as though her true value were vi, we can provide a
bound on the difference above, which may be used to show that
β˜tm,nt(ωt, vi, vj, y
>m+1
t )− β˜tm+1,nt(ωt, vj, y>m+1t ) > 0.
Thus, the exit of the buyer with rank (m + 1) does not induce the immediate exit of any buyer
with a higher value. Therefore, since β˜tm,nt(ωt, vi, vj, y
>m+1
t ) is strictly increasing in vi, the price at
which this exit occurs fully reveals the value of the (m + 1)-th highest-ranked buyer.
Since m was arbitrarily chosen, this implies that the drop-out points of buyers bidding accord-
ing to the strategy described by Equation (6) are fully revealing of the buyers’ values. 
CLAIM. Following the bidding strategies β˜tm,nt in every period t in the sequential ascending auction mech-
anism is outcome equivalent to the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism.
PROOF OF CLAIM. Fix an arbitrary period t ∈N0, and let kt denote the number of objects present,
and nt := |At| denote the number of agents present. As shown above, the bidding strategies β˜tm,nt
are strictly increasing; therefore, the multi-unit uniform-price ascending auction ends allocates the
kt objects to the group of buyers with the kt highest values greater than the reserve.18 Recall that if
18Recall that buyers with values less than r˜ bid up to their true value, as they are never allocated an object, and so their
future expected contribution to the virtual surplus is zero.
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kt ≥ nt, the auction ends immediately upon the price reaching the reserve value r˜, and all buyers
present receive an object at that price. Similarly, in the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism, each
buyer i with vi > r˜ receives an object, and makes a payment p˜Fi,t given by
p˜Fi,t(ωt, vt) = vi − w˜Fi (ωt, vt),
where w˜Fi is the agent’s marginal contribution to the virtual surplus.
19 However, since there are
sufficient objects present for each agent with a non-negative virtual value to receive one, i does
not impose any externalities on the remaining agents; thus,
w˜Fi (ωt, vt) = w˜i(ωt, vt) = vi − r˜,
implying that p˜Fi,t(ωt, vt) = r˜. In this case, then, the allocation and payments of the auction mech-
anism and the dynamic pivot mechanism are the same.
Suppose instead that kt < nt; that is, there are more agents present than objects. Denote by im
the bidder with the m-th highest value. Then each agent who receives an object pays the greater
of the reserve price r˜ and the price at which buyer ikt+1 drops out of the auction, which is given by
β̂tkt+1,nt(ωt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ) = vikt+1 − wt+1(ωt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ).
If vikt+1 < r˜, then the situation is identical to the previous case. Therefore, assume that vikt+1 ≥ r˜.
In the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism, on the other hand, each agent i who receives an object
pays a price
p˜Fi,t(ωt, vt) = vi − wFi (ωt, vt)
= vi −E
[
∞
∑
s=t
∑
j∈I
δs−t x˜j,s(ωs, vs)(vj − r˜)
]
+E
 ∞∑
s=t
∑
j∈I\{i}
δs−t x˜j,s(ω−is , vs)(vj − r˜)
 .
This may be rewritten as
vi −
(
kt
∑
m=1
(vm − r˜) +E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
∑
j∈I
δs−t x˜j,s(ωs, vs)(vj − r˜)
])
+
(
kt
∑
m=1
(vm − r˜) + (vikt+1 − vi) +E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
∑
j∈I
δs−t x˜j,s(ω
−i,−ikt+1
s , vs)(vj − r˜)
])
.
Rearranging the above expression allows us to rewrite it as
p˜Fi,t(ωt, vt) = vikt+1 −E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
∑
j∈I
δs−t x˜j,s(ωs, vs)(vj − r˜)
]
+E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
∑
j∈I
δs−t x˜j,s(ω
−i,−ikt+1
s , vs)(vj − r˜)
]
= vikt+1 − w˜t+1(ωt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ),
19Note that since i is receiving an object, her total and flow marginal contributions are equal.
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where the second equality follows from the fact that wt+1(ωt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ) is defined to be the
expected future marginal contribution to the virtual surplus of the agent with the (kt + 1)-th high-
est value, conditional on agents with higher values (which includes i) receiving an object today.
Therefore, following the bidding strategies β˜tm,nt leads to period-t prices and allocations identical
to those of the dynamic pivot mechanism. Since the period t was arbitrary, as was the state ωt,
this equivalence holds after each history. Thus, the two mechanisms are outcome equivalent. 
Finally, it remains to be seen that the bidding strategies in Equation (6) do, in fact, form an equi-
librium. As in the case of the sequential ascending auction with no reserve, the bidding strategies
β˜tm,nt are strictly increasing. Behavior along the equilibrium path is therefore perfectly separating,
implying that Bayesian updating fully determines beliefs. In order to determine optimality off
the equilibrium path, we again suppose that, after a deviation, buyers ignore their past observa-
tions and the history of the mechanism, and instead believe that the deviating agent is currently
truthfully revealing her value in accordance with the bidding strategies β˜tm,nt .
CLAIM. Suppose that in each period, buyers bid according to the cutoff strategies given in Equation (6).
This strategy profile, combined with the system of beliefs described above, forms a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium of the sequential ascending auction mechanism with reserve price r˜.
PROOF OF CLAIM. We prove this claim by making use of the one-shot deviation principle. Con-
sider any period with nt := |At| buyers on the market and kt objects present. Suppose that all
bidders other than player i are using the conjectured equilibrium strategies. We must show that
bidder i has no profitable one-shot deviations from the collection of cutoff points {β˜tm,nt}. More
specifically, we must show that i does not wish to exit the auction earlier than prescribed, nor does
she wish to remain active later than specified.
Once again labeling agents such that buyer i1 has the highest value and buyer int has the lowest,
note that if vi < max{vikt , r˜}, bidding according to {β˜tm,nt} implies that i does not win an object
in the current period. Therefore, exiting earlier than specified does not affect i’s current-period
returns. Moreover, since the bidding strategies are memoryless, neither future behavior by i’s
competitors nor i’s future payoffs will be affected by an early exit.
Suppose, on the other hand, that vi > r˜ and that i has one of the kt highest values; that is, that
vi ≥ max{vikt , r˜}. As established by Proposition 2, i receives an object, paying a price such that her
payoff is exactly equal to her marginal contribution to the virtual surplus. Deviating to an early
exit, however, leads either to agent ikt+1 winning an object (if vikt+1 ≥ r˜) instead of buyer i, or to
an object being discarded. Moreover, i’s expected payoff is then w˜t+1(ωt, vi, vikt+2 , . . . , vint ), which
we defined as i’s future expected marginal contribution to the virtual surplus. This is a profitable
one-shot deviation for i if, and only if,
w˜t+1(ωt, vi, vikt+2 , . . . , vint ) ≥ vi − β˜tkt,nt(ωt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ).
Rearranging this inequality yields
β˜tkt,nt(ωt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ) ≥ vi − w˜t+1(ωt, vi, vikt+2 , . . . , vint ) = β˜tkt,nt(ωt, vi, vikt+2 , . . . , vint ),
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where the equality comes from the definition of β˜tkt,nt in Equation (6). Since vi > vikt+1 , this contra-
dicts the conclusion of the first claim above. Thus, i does not wish to exit the auction early.
Alternately, if vi ≥ max{vikt , r˜}, then planning to remain active in the auction longer than
specified does not change i’s payoffs, as i will win an object regardless. If, on the other hand,
vi < max{vikt , r˜}, then delaying exit from the period-t auction can affect i’s payoffs. Since bids
in future periods do not depend on information revealed in the current period, this only occurs
if i remains in the auction long enough to win an object. If i wins, she pays a price equal to the
larger of r˜ and the exit point of ivkt , whereas if she exits, she receives as her continuation payoff
her marginal contribution to the virtual surplus. So, suppose that i = im for some m > kt. Then a
deviation to remaining active in the auction is profitable if, and only if,
vm − β˜tkt,nt(ωt, vikt , . . . , vim−1 , vm+1, . . . , vint ) ≥ w˜t+1(ωt, vm, . . . , vint ).
Rearranging this inequality yields
β˜tkt,nt(ωt, vikt , . . . , vim−1 , vm+1, . . . , vint ) ≤ vm − w˜t+1(ωt, vm, . . . , vint ) = β˜tm−1,nt(ωt, vm, . . . , vint ),
where the equality comes from the definition of β˜tm−1,nt in Equation (6). As above, the fact that
vm < vikt contradicts the conclusion of the claim above regarding the monotonicity of bids. There-
fore, i does not desire to remain active in the auction long enough to receive an object.
Thus, we have shown that no player has any incentive to deviate from the prescribed strategies
when on the equilibrium path. In particular, using the bidding strategies β˜tm,nt is sequentially ra-
tional given players’ beliefs along the equilibrium path. Recall, however, that we have specified
off-equilibrium beliefs such that buyers “ignore” their past observations when they observe a de-
viation from equilibrium play, updating their beliefs to place full probability on the valuation that
rationalizes the deviation; they believe that the deviating agent is currently being truthful with re-
gards to the strategies β˜tm,nt . The argument above then implies that continuing to bid according to
the specified strategies remains sequentially rational with respect to these updated beliefs. Thus,
bidding according to the cutoffs in Equation (6) is optimal along the entire game tree: this strategy
profile forms a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential ascending auction mechanism. 
Thus, bidding in each period according to the strategy described in Equation (6) forms a per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential ascending auction with reserve price r˜; moreover, this
equilibrium is outcome equivalent to the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism. 
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